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1. INTRODUCTION
In the 1980s, electronic bank services, including electronic funds
transfers, became increasingly common in developed countries. With re-
spect to the period from 1978 to 1983, the Bank for International Set-
tlements commented:
During the past five years the wider use made of electronic
data processing has made it possible in certain countries for
large corporate customers to establish direct links between
their own accounting procedures and those of the banks, and
to make direct transfers to the debit or credit of other cus-
tomers and other banks via telecommunications.
For smaller business customers and individuals, bank-
ing automation has had less of an impact. . ..'
Today, electronic funds transfers by banks are more common than
ever before. The type of funds transfer made by large corporate cus-
tomers, often referred to as a "wholesale wire transfer,"2 nevertheless
remains distinctive. Its salient characteristics include use of the banking
system, a large amount of money, initiation by a payor, a transferor
and a transferee that are sophisticated business or financial organiza-
tions, individual rather than batch processing, extremely low fees, and
use of high-speed computers, telecommunications, and security proce-
dures.3 The purpose of a wholesale wire transfer usually is to pay an
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I BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, PAYMENT SYSTEMS IN ELEVEN
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES at 1 (1985).
2 See FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, THE FEDERAL RESERVE WIRE
TRANSFER NETWORK at 1 (August, 1989) [hereinafter cited as FEDWIRE REPORT].
"Wholesale" refers to the customary large amounts of these transfers and "wire" refers
to the typical use of electronic means of transmission. See Scott, Corporate Wire Trans-
fers and the Uniform New Payments Code, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1664 (1983).
1 See U.C.C. art. 4A prefatory note at 477, § 4A-103(a)(1), § 4A-201 and official
comment and § 4A-104 official comment 2 (West ed. 1991) [hereinafter cited by section
number if there is one, otherwise as Article 4A]; FEDWIRE REPORT, supra note 2, at
1,7.
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obligation of a transferor.4 Such transfers typically are effected by en-
tries in bank accounts.5
The economic significance of wholesale wire transfers is immense.
In March, 1988, the volume of payments upon the two American sys-
tems used for wholesale wire transfers - the Federal Reserve Wire
Transfer Network (FEDWIRE) and the New York City Clearing
House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS) - approximated 1.3 tril-
lion dollars per day.' The average FEDWIRE transfer was $2.9 mil-
lion and the average CHIPS transfer was $4.6 million.' Gerald Corri-
gan, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, has observed
that "the safe and uninterrupted operations of the large-dollar elec-
tronic payments system is absolutely indispensable to the safe and pru-
dent operations of the banking and financial system and to the economy
at large.""
Despite their economic significance, the United States is one of the
few nations that regulates wholesale wire transfers through specialized
legislation. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws promulgated Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code
in 1989 and recommended its enactment by every American state.9 As
evidenced by its 1990 passage in twelve states, including commercially-
important New York, California, and Illinois, and by its 1991 enact-
ment by eighteen additional states, Article 4A should be adopted
throughout the United States. 0
Additionally, since January 1, 1991, the Federal Reserve Board
has designated the Official Text of Article 4A as the law governing
FEDWIRE.11 This was the same date upon which most of the twelve
A bank transfer that is initiated by a payor is referred to as a "credit transfer" and
a bank transfer that is initiated by a payee is referred to as a "debit transfer." U.C.C. §
4A-104 offical comment 4.
' U.C.C. § 4A-104 official comment 2.
See id; FEDWIRE REPORT, supra note 2, at 9.
8 Mengle, Legal and Regulatory Reform in Electronic Payments: An Evaluation
of Payment Finality Rules, THE U.S. PAYMENT SYSTEM: EFFIcIENcY, RISK AND THE
ROLE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE 145, 175 n.1 (1990) [hereinafter cited as Mengle].
7 Id.
I FEDERAL RESERVE BANK oF NEW YORK, 1986 ANNUAL REPORT at 17 (1987)
[hereinafter cited as 1986 ANNUAL REPORT].
See art. 4A prefatory note at 476.
10 As of September, 1991, Article 4A had been adopted in Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vir-
ginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. STATE CORRELATION TABLES,
UCC REP. SERV. xvii (Callaghan 1991) [hereinafter STATE CORRELATION TABLES].
" Regulation J, 55 Fed. Reg. 40791-40814 (1990). Although the Federal Reserve




1990 state enactments of Article 4A became effective. 12 January 1,
1991 thus marked the applicability of Article 4A to virtually all whole-
sale wire transfers in the United States.
3
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) also is developing a Model Law on International
Credit Transfers, the most recent UNCITRAL draft with Comments
being the product of the Twenty-Second Session of the UNCITRAL
International Payments Working Group that was held in November
and December, 1990.14 Both Article 4A and the Model Law are lim-
ited to credit transfers that are initiated by payors,'15 but otherwise
cover most wholesale wire transfers"' that utilize "banks."' 7 In 1989,
made. Id. at 40792-93.
Subpart B of Federal Reserve Board Regulation J governs FEDWIRE. Id. at
40801. The Board's adoption of Article 4A hereinafter will be cited as Regulation J.
12 See STATE CORRELATION TABLES, supra note 10. The California, New York,
and Illinois enactments all became effective on January 1, 1991. Id.
'" Under the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation J, Article 4A applies to all
FEDWIRE transfers whether or not a Federal Reserve Bank participating in a funds
transfer is located in an enacting jurisdiction. Regulation J, supra note 11, at 40792.
CHIPS, the other American system that transmits wholesale wire transfers, is located
in New York City and is subject to the New York state enactment of Article 4A.
14 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/346 (May, 1991) [hereinafter cited as U.N. Model Law
with article number if one exists, otherwise as UNCITRAL MAY, 1991 REPORT]. The
principal prior draft of the U.N. Model Law was WORKING PAPER 49, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.9/WG.IV/WP.49 (1990) [hereinafter cited as WORKING PAPER 49].
15 U.C.C. § 4A-103(a)(1)(ii), § 4A-104 official comment 4; U.N. Model Law
arts. 1(1), 2(a)-(d).
By requiring that a sender transmit a payment order to a receiving bank, both
statutes are intended to preclude a check and a credit card slip from per se constituting
a payment order. See U.C.C. § 4A-103(a)(1)(iii); U.N. Model Law art. 2(a),(b),(e). A
debtor typically delivers a check or a credit card slip to a payee, a counterpart of an
Article 4A and a Model Law beneficiary, and it is the payee that utilizes the banking
system to obtain payment. U.C.C. § 4A-104 official comment 5. In contrast to a sender
of a payment order who must pay the order, a payee utilizes a check or a credit card
slip to obtain payment.
16 See U.C.C. art. 4A prefatory note at 477-79 (wholesale wire transfers principal
transfers covered), § 4A-108 (a funds transfer, any part of which is governed by the
federal Electronic Fund Transfer Act, excluded), § 4A-108 official comment (the fed-
eral Electronic Fund Transfer Act covers transfers involving consumers); U.N. Model
Law art. 1 comments 15-17 (all international credit transfers, including transfers for
consumer purposes, are covered, but the Model Law omits consumer protection issues).
For discussion of the types of consumer transactions excluded from Article 4A, see
Note, Commercial Law: Electronic Funds Transfers: How New U.C.C. Article 4A
May Affect Consumers, 43 OKLA. L. REV. 339 (1990).
17 Both statutes require that a payment order instruct a "receiving bank" to make
payment. U.C.C. § 4A-103(a)(1); U.N. Model Law art. 2(b). Their respective defini-
tions of "bank" determine the nature of this requirement. The Article 4A definition
includes Federal Reserve and foreign banks and some domestic financial institutions
that are not commercial banks. A "bank" is any person engaged in the business of
banking and includes a savings bank, savings and loan association, credit union, and
trust company. U.C.C. § 4A-105(a)(2); U.C.C. § 4A-105 official comment 1. The
Model Law, on the other hand, treats as a "bank" any "entity which, as an ordinary
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the differences in approach between Article 4A and the Model Law
were so great that the United States delegation to UNCITRAL pro-
posed subdividing the Model Law into one series of rules, like those in
Article 4A, for high-speed, electronic payments systems, and a second
series of rules, like those in the Model Law, for slower, more paper-
based payments systems."8 Although subsequent changes have been
made in the Model Law, significant substantive differences between it
and Article 4A remain.19 The jurisdictions and transactions the statutes
purport to cover also differ. Article 4A is to be enacted by American
states for credit transfers involving banks within each state; the Model
Law is to be enacted by national legislatures for credit transfers involv-
ing banks in different countries.20 Notwithstanding their differences,
Article 4A and the Model Law contain contemporary notions of the
legal finality rules appropriate for wholesale wire transfers. These fi-
nality rules will be compared and contrasted with the finality rules cur-
rently used by BOJ-NET, a domestic Japanese electronic funds-trans-
fer system that is operated by the Bank of Japan (BOJ).21
If an attempted wholesale wire transfer fails, both Article 4A and
the Model Law provide a "money-back guarantee" that cancels a
sender's executory obligation to make payment and also entitles a
sender to a refund of any payment that has been made.22 The money-
back guarantee effectively postpones the legal finality of a transfer until
its completion. Article 4A, moreover, contains statutory exceptions to
the legal finality of completed wholesale wire transfers that are no
longer subject to the money-back guarantee.2 3 The BOJ-NET rules, on
the other hand, allow an initial sender to establish a limited period of
unequivocal nonfinality in which the desirability of completing an exec-
part of its business, engages in executing payment orders." U.N. Model Law art. 2(f).
This open-ended definition clearly includes securities dealers and post offices that exe-
cute payment orders for customers and also seems to include clearing houses and some
message systems. U.N. Model Law art. 2 comments 3-37.
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/329 at 31 (1989).
19 See, e.g., UNCITRAL MAY, 1991 REPORT supra note 14, introductory com-
ment 8 at 4. A proposal by the United States delegation that funds-transfer system
rules supersede Model Law gap-filling rules, for example, has been rejected. U.N.
Model Law art. 3 comment 1. See also the markedly-different definitions of "bank"
that are discussed in supra note 17.
20 See U.C.C. § 4A-507(a) (choice-of-law rule can depend upon bank location);
U.N. Model Law art. 1 comments 2-13. Comment 3 discusses an amendment that
would make the Model Law applicable to domestic as well as international credit
transfers.
21 See PAYMENT SYSTEM PROJECT TEAM OF THE BANK OF JAPAN, OUTLINE OF
BANK OF JAPAN FINANCIAL NETWORK SYSTEM (BOJ-NET) (1989) [hereinafter
BOJ-NET].
22 See infra notes 108-113 and accompanying text.




utory transfer can be re-evaluated.24 In view of the importance of
wholesale wire transfers, these differing approaches to legal finality
merit careful consideration.
2. FINALITY CONCEPTS
Wholesale wire transfers typically involve extensions of large
amounts of short-term credit. 25 Literally every relationship in a whole-
sale wire transfer can involve the extension of credit. A receiver typi-
cally has extended either long-term or short-term credit to a sender in
the transaction underlying a transfer. During a transfer, an initial
sender can extend short-term credit to a sending bank by prepaying a
transfer, or, alternatively, a sending bank can extend short-term credit
to an initial sender by executing a transfer that is not fully prepaid.
Subsequent sending banks similarly either can extend short-term credit
to, or receive short-term credit from, their sending banks. Additionally,
a receiving bank can extend short-term credit either by giving irrevoca-
ble credit to a receiver or by allowing a receiver to withdraw provi-
sional credit prior to the bank's receipt of settlement. Finally, to the
extent that a receiver does not withdraw the credit for a transfer fol-
lowing a receiving bank's receipt of settlement, the receiver extends
short-term credit to the receiving bank.2"
Because of their volume and the large amounts of money in-
volved,27 wholesale wire transfers generate huge aggregate amounts of
short-term credit on a daily basis." This aggregate short-term credit
enhances the theoretical possibility of systemic failure- an insolvency
of one or more major participants in a funds-transfer system that trig-
gers a chain of defaults and financial chaos.2 9 Payment system regula-
tors, including the American Regional Federal Reserve Banks that ad-
minister FEDWIRE, consider that imposing legal finality upon
wholesale wire transfers reduces systemic risk.30
Legal finality is primarily important with respect to payment in-
structions for wholesale wire transfers that have been accepted by a
bank. Prior to its acceptance, a payment instruction s does not create
11 See infra notes 298-307 and accompanying text.
'8 1986 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 16.
26 See Mengle, supra note 6, at 150-51.
17 See, e.g., supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
I' 1986 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 30.
29 Id. at 16.
30 See id. at 29-32.
31 The reasons a payment instruction may not have been accepted by a bank in-
clude: cancellation prior to acceptance by a receiving bank, U.C.C. § 4A-
211(b)(cancellation that allows a receiving bank a reasonable time to act is effective);
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short-term credit. With respect to payment instructions that have been
accepted by a bank, "settlement," the satisfaction of obligations between
banks,3 2 is a key concept.
Possible elements of legal finality include "sender finality," "re-
ceiver finality," and "settlement finality."3 "Sender finality" precludes
a sender from unilaterally cancelling a payment instruction. Irrespec-
tive of receipt of settlement, "receiver finality" obligates a receiving
bank to give irrevocable credit to a receiving customer. "Settlement fi-
nality," on the other hand, requires that the banks participating in a
payments system cover the net debts of a failed sending bank in order
to assure that settlement takes place.34 Sender finality, receiver finality,
and settlement finality are imposed prior to a receiving bank's receipt
of an incontestably "good-money" 35 settlement for a funds transfer,
which is another possible criterion for legal finality.36 Under a good-
money settlement approach, a funds transfer remains incomplete and a
receiver retains his or her underlying claim against a sender until a
receiver's bank has received a good-money settlement."
Pre-settlement finality is related to the short-term credit that is
generated by wholesale wire transfers. Sender finality requires a sender
to settle for a payment instruction upon which a receiving bank has
extended short-term credit.-8 Settlement finality also protects the exten-
sion of short-term credit by assuring completion of a transfer notwith-
the insolvency of either a sender or a receiving bank, U.C.C. § 4A-210(c) (all unac-
cepted orders are deemed rejected upon a receiving bank's suspension of payments); a
receiving bank's knowledge of the death or legal incapacity of a sender that is a natural
person, U.C.C. § 4A-211(g) (death or legal incapacity do not revoke an instruction
unless a receiving bank both has knowledge and a reasonable opportunity to act prior
to acceptance); and the staleness of an instruction, U.C.C. § 4A-211(d) (an unaccepted
instruction is canceled by operation of law at the close of the fifth business day of a
receiving bank following the date upon which acceptance should have taken place).
32 Patrikis, Baxter & Bhala, Article 4A: The New Law of Funds Transfers and
the Role of Counsel, 23 U.C.C. L.J. 219, 252 n.105 (1991) [hereinafter Patrikis].
" See D. Humphrey, Payments Finality and Risk of Settlement Failure: Implica-
tions for Financial Markets at 16-21 (Paper prepared for the 1985 Conference on
Technology and the Regulation of Financial Markets, N.Y.U. Graduate School of Bus-
iness Administration) [hereinafter Humphrey].
34 Id.
" "Good-money" is any form of settlement that is unaffected by the obligor's be-
coming insolvent the instant after settlement. Corrigan, Perspectives on Payment System
Risk Reduction, in THE U.S. PAYMENT SYSTEM: EFFICIENCY, RISK AND THE ROLE
OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE at 130-31 (1990).
8 See Mengle, supra note 6, at 157-59. Mengle describes this approach as "check
finality" because of its similarity to the current American rule concerning the finality of
payment of a check. Id.
37 Id.




standing the insolvency of a participating bank. 9 Receiver finality, on
the other hand, concentrates the risk of failure of settlement upon re-
ceiving banks, theoretically motivating those banks to reduce systemic
risk by rejecting payment instructions involving unreasonable credit
risks. 0
Post-settlement finality has a dual function. With respect to a
transaction in which a receiving bank receives a good-money settlement,
post-settlement finality protects the integrity of the completed funds
transfer. With respect to a transaction in which a good-money settle-
ment fails, good-money settlement finality allocates the risk of loss to a
sender.
Finality rules can be utilized to create an incentive for the "cheap-
est cost avoider" to minimize losses and spread losses that occur."1 Both
sender and receiver finality theoretically involve assignment of a loss to
the cheapest cost avoider in order to encourage care by senders in issu-
ing payment orders and by receiving banks in accepting them.42 Settle-
ment finality, on the other hand, typically spreads losses caused by the
failure of system participants. To the extent that liability for loss-
spreading depends upon dealings with a failed bank, settlement finality
may also create an incentive for system participants to avoid loss.43 Fi-
nally, by allowing the recipient to retain a claim against the sender
until receipt of good-money by the recipient's bank, good-money settle-
ment finality allocates the risk of failure of other system participants to
the sender.44
Article 4A and the Model Law adopt different positions with re-
spect to the legal finality of funds transfers. A survey of the terminology
of the statutes will facilitate discussion of their positions.
3. ARTICLE 4A AND MODEL LAW TERMINOLOGY
Under both Article 4A and the Model Law, a funds transfer in-
volves: (1) an "originator," an initiator of a funds transfer that may or
may not be a bank; (2) an "originator's bank;" (3) a "beneficiary," the
person intended by an originator to receive funds that may or may not
be a bank; and (4) a "beneficiary's bank."'45
31 See Mengle, supra note 6, at 159-61.
40 Id. at 162-63.
42 Id. at 154.
42 See id. at 162-63 (discussion of receiver finality).
43 See id. at 160-61.
44 See id. at 158-59. A recipient naturally assumes the risk of failure of his or her
own bank.
41 See U.C.C. § 4A-103(a)(2)-(3), § 4A-104(c)-(d); U.N. Model Law art. 2(c)-
(e),(g),(h).
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Under Article 4A, one bank can perform multiple functions. An
originator that is a bank, for example, is both an originator and an
originator's bank.4" If an originator is a bank and a beneficiary has an
account with an originator, an Article 4A transfer can involve only two
parties and one bank.4" It is common, however, for both different origi-
nator's and beneficiary's banks, and other banks which both statutes
refer to as "intermediary banks,' 48 to be involved. Article 4A, further-
more, treats each branch and separate office of a bank as a separate
"bank." 49
Unlike Article 4A, the Model Law does not define either "origina-
tor's bank" or "beneficiary's bank." The Commentary, nevertheless,
takes the position that a single bank can not be both an originator and
an originator's bank. 0 The Model Law also does not uniformly treat
each branch and separate office as a separate bank.5' These are not
fundamental differences from Article 4A, however, and may be
reconsidered.52
Under both statutes, a "payment order" is an instruction by a
"sender," a person making payment, to a "receiving bank" to pay ei-
ther a fixed or a determinable amount of money to a "beneficiary.
5
3
Because the instruction to a receiving bank must be given by a payor, a
payment order initiates what bankers refer to as a "credit transfer"
rather than a "debit transfer. 54 Payment orders can be transmitted
orally or in writing, as well as electronically. 55 With the exception of
6 See U.C.C. § 4A-104(d) (originator's bank includes the originator if the origi-
nator is a bank).
47 See U.C.C. § 4A-104(d), § 4A-104 official comment 1, case #1 (Article 4A
applies to "book transfers" in which the originator and the beneficiary have accounts in
the same bank). A "drawdown transfer," another atypically simple type of transfer
covered, involves one party and two banks. A corporation with accounts in both Banks
A and B, for example, that instructs Bank A to make a payment to the corporation's
account in Bank B would be subject to Article 4A. U.C.C. § 4A-104 official comment
4.
48 U..C. § 4A-104(b); U.N. Model Law art. 2(h).
" See U.C.C. § 4A-105(a)(2).
5 U.N. Model Law art. 1 comment 4, art. 2 comments 25-26. The Commentary
likewise states that, in view of its test for the internationality of a transfer, the Model
Law would not apply to book transfers in which a nonbank originator and a nonbank
beneficiary had accounts in the same branch of the same bank. U.N. Model Law art. 1
comment 12.
51 U.N. Model Law art. 2 comments 41-44.
52 Substantial changes have been made in the Model Law at each meeting of the
UNCITRAL Working Group. See UNCITRAL MAY, 1991 REPORT, supra note 14,
comment 4 at 3.
53 U.C.C. § 4A-103(a)(1)-(a)(5); U.N. Model Law art. 2(b)-(e),(g).
54 U.C.C. § 4A-104 official comment 4; U.N. Model Law art. 2(b)(ii) comments
21-23.




optional designation of the time at which a receiving bank is to act
upon an instruction, a payment order must be unconditional. "6
Except for a beneficiary and a beneficiary's bank, under both stat-
utes each participant in a funds transfer is a sender and issues a pay-
ment order to a receiving bank.57 Thus, an originator issues a payment
order to an originator's bank, which is the originator's receiving bank;
if the originator's bank issues a payment order to an intermediary
bank, the intermediary bank is the originator's bank's receiving bank; if
the intermediary bank issues a payment order to the beneficiary's bank,
the beneficiary's bank is the intermediary bank's receiving bank. The
beneficiary's bank, on the other hand, pays the beneficiary.58
Both statutes frequently distinguish between a receiving bank that
is, and a receiving bank that is not, a beneficiary's bank.59 Where this
distinction is unimportant, the generic term "receiving bank" .is used
hereinafter. A receiving bank that is not a beneficiary's bank otherwise
is hereinafter referred to as an "executing bank,' 6° and a receiving
bank that is a beneficiary's bank as a "beneficiary's bank."
The mere receipt of a payment order does not obligate a receiving
bank to participate in a funds transfer that involves any significant
credit risk. Unless an obligation to accept has been assumed by con-
tract, under both statutes a receiving bank has discretion to reject a
payment order that involves significant credit risk.6" If a payment order
56 U.C.C. § 4A-103(1)(a)(i), § 4A-301(b), § 4A-401; U.N. Model Law art.
2(b),(k),(m); U.N. Model Law art. 2 comments 14-16.
Conditions unrelated to the time of payment are inconsistent with the high speed
and low price of wholesale wire transfers, which in part is made possible by automated
processing. U.C.C. § 4A-104 official comment 3. Both statutes, however, leave a bank
customer and a bank free to include any conditions that they wish in an account agree-
ment. See Baxter & Bhala, Proper and Improper Execution of Payment Orders, 45
Bus. LAW. 1447, 1448-49 (1990). The Model Law also provides that satisfaction of a
condition prior to execution of a payment instruction by a bank cures the prior failure
of the instruction to constitute a payment order. U.N. Model Law art. 2(b); U.N.
Model Law art. 2 comments 17-19.
51 See U.C.C. § 4A-103(a)(5), § 4A-104(c), § 4A-301(a), § 4A-404; U.N. Model
Law arts. 2(d)-(e), 6(1)-(2), 8(1), 9(1).
58 Id.
, See, e.g., U.C.O. § 4A-209(a)-(b); U.N. Model Law arts. 7, 9.
60 This terminology is consistent with both the Uniform Act and the Model Law.
Under both statutes "execution" consists of issue of a payment order that is intended to
carry out a payment order previously issued to a receiving bank that is not a benefi-
ciary's bank. U.O.C. § 4A-301(a); U.N. Model Law art. 2(1).
41 U.C.C. § 4A-209, § 4A-210; U.N. Model Law arts. 6, 8. If there is no signifi-
cant credit risk because a beneficiary's bank has received final settlement from a send-
ing bank through a Federal Reserve Bank or a funds-transfer system, Article 4A, how-
ever, ordinarily conclusively deems acceptance to occur and does not allow rejection.
U.O.O. § 4A-209(b)(2), § 4A-209(c), § 4A-403(a)(1) (deemed acceptance does not oc-
cur if a beneficiary does not have an open account with a beneficiary's bank or the
bank is not permitted by law to receive credits for the beneficiary's account). See infra
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requires a receiving bank to issue its own payment order prior to re-
ceipt of settlement, the receiving bank, for example, can avoid ex-
tending short-term credit to its sender by rejecting the order.
62
The Model Law alone imposes duties upon a receiving bank with
respect to unaccepted orders. Any bank that receives a payment order,
for example, must notify an identified sender of errors, including erro-
neous issue of the order to an unintended receiving bank.63 These pro-
visions have no Article 4A counterparts.6 4
Under both statutes, "acceptance" of a payment order by a receiv-
ing bank obligates both the sender and the receiving bank. A sender is
obligated by its receiving bank's acceptance to pay the amount of the
accepted order to the receiving bank. 5 An executing bank, on the other
hand, is obligated by its acceptance to execute its sender's order by issu-
ing a conforming order, 6 and a beneficiary's bank is obligated by its
acceptance to pay the amount of an accepted order to the beneficiary.
67
Both statutes identify the voluntary conduct of a receiving bank
that constitutes acceptance. To the extent that significant credit risk ex-
ists, a receiving bank's option to reject is preserved.68 Under Article 4A,
an executing bank can accept only by issuing a payment order intended
to execute its sender's order.69 Although additional forms of acceptance
also are recognized, including a failure to make a timely rejection fol-
lowing receipt of payment, issue of a payment order also should be the
most common form of acceptance by an executing bank under the
Model Law.70
A beneficiary's bank can accept in several ways under both stat-
note 73 and accompanying text for the Article 4A definition of a funds-transfer system.
6 See U.C.C. art. 4A, supra note 3, prefatory note at 480-81; U.N. Model Law
art. 6 comments 8-9, 17-19; U.N. Model Law art. 8 comment 1.
In order to preclude an unnecessary entanglement with insolvency proceedings,
U.C.C. § 4A-210(c) also provides that all previously unaccepted orders are deemed
rejected upon the suspension of payments by a receiving bank.
63 U.N. Model Law arts. 6(3)-(5), 8(2)-(4).
U.C.C. art. 4A, moreover, defines a "receiving bank" as a bank to which a
sender's instruction is addressed; whereas the Model Law treats any bank that receives
a payment order as a receiving bank and subject to a duty to notify a sender of errors.
Compare U.C.C. § 4A-103(a)(4) with U.N. Model Law art. 2(g).
65 U.C.O. § 4A-402(b),(c); U.N. Model Law art. 4(6). The date that a sender's
payment to a receiving bank is due can be designated in a payment order. See U.C.C. §
4A-402(b),(c); U.N. Model Law art. 4(6).
66 U.C.C. § 4A-302(a); U.N. Model Law art. 7(2).
617 U.C.C. § 4A-404(a); U.N. Model Law art. 9(1). In some instances, a benefi-
ciary's bank also is obligated by its acceptance to notify a beneficiary of receipt of a
payment order. U.C.C. § 4A-404(b); U.N. Model Law art. 9(5).
11 See U.C.C. § 4A-209(a),(b); U.N. Model Law arts. 6(2), 8(1).
6 U.C.C. § 4A-209(a), § 4A-301(a).




utes. As a general proposition, acceptance involves either the availabil-
ity of settlement and a beneficiary's bank's failure to make a timely
rejection of a payment order, or, regardless of the availability of settle-
ment, conduct by a beneficiary's bank that could cause a beneficiary
reasonably to believe that the credit for a payment order could be
used.71 Either the presence of a sufficient withdrawable credit balance
in an account of a sender with a beneficiary's bank plus the bank's
failure to reject the payment order in timely fashion, or unconditional
notice to a beneficiary of the crediting his or her account, for example,
constitute acceptance. 2 Under both statutes, the conduct that consti-
tutes acceptance of a payment order can be varied by a contract with a
receiving bank, and, with respect to participating banks, through rules
adopted by a "funds-transfer system," an association of banks with a
communications system for transmitting payment orders.73
4. AN OVERVIEW OF ARTICLE 4A AND MODEL LAW FINALITY
CONCEPTS
As a general proposition, the rights and obligations created by Ar-
ticle 4A can be varied with the agreement of an affected party.74 There
are relatively few exceptions to this deference to freedom of contract,
7 5
71 See U.C.C. § 4A-209(b), § 4A-403(a)(1), § 4A-403(2), § 4A-405(a)-(b); U.N.
Model Law art. 8.
72 U.C.C. § 4A-209(b)(1),(3); U.N. Model Law arts. 8(1)(a), 8(l)(a)(e), 8(2).
" See U.C.C. § 4A-209 official comment 3; U.N. Model Law arts. 3, 6(2)(b),
8(1)(b).
Article 4A alone defines a funds-transfer system:
"Funds-transfer system" means a wire transfer network, automated clear-
ing house, or other communication system of a clearing house or other
association of banks through which a payment order by a bank may be
transmitted to the bank to which the order is addressed.
U.C.C. § 4A-105(a)(5).
Under this Article 4A definition, a funds-transfer system merely communicates a
sender's payment order. Neither the system nor its members issue payment orders of
their own. Because Federal Reserve Banks execute a sender's FEDWIRE payment
order by issuing a payment order, FEDWIRE is not an Article 4A funds-transfer sys-
tem. See U.C.C. § 4A-105 official comment 3, § 4A-107 official comment 2. CHIPS,
which merely transmits a sender's payment order, on the other hand, is an Article 4A
funds-transfer system. See U.C.C. § 4A-105 official comment 3. It is irrelevant under
the Article 4A definition that CHIPS also settles for the payment orders that it trans-
mits. Id.
74 U.C.C. § 4A-501(a).
7' The exceptions are: U.C.C. § 4A-202(f) (limitations upon agreements with re-
spect to liability for unauthorized payment orders), § 4A-204(b) (obligation of a receiv-
ing bank to refund payment received for an unauthorized and ineffective payment order
and an unenforceable payment order not variable by agreement), § 4A-305(f) (limita-
tions upon agreements affecting a receiving bank's liability for late or improper execu-
tion and failure to execute a payment order), § 4A-402(O (a sender's right to excuse of
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one of which involves a beneficiary's right to payment by a benefi-
ciary's bank that has accepted a payment order. An agreement limiting
a beneficiary's right to payment is unenforceable.
7
1
Unless Article 4A provides otherwise, an agreement varying the
statutory rights and obligations of the banks participating in a funds-
transfer system can be in the form of a funds-transfer system rule." A
few special provisions also authorize funds-transfer system rules to alter
specific statutory rights and obligations of originators and beneficiaries
that are not system-participants.78 Two types of special rules, for ex-
ample, can nullify the right of a nonparticipating beneficiary to pay-
ment by a beneficiary's bank that has accepted a payment order.79 A
nonparticipant that otherwise would not be bound by a funds-transfer
system rule, moreover, ordinarily can agree to be bound,8" and a funds-
transfer system generally can require its participating banks to obtain
an agreement to be bound by the system's objectively-reasonable rules
from a nonparticipant that utilizes -the system."1
As a general proposition, the rights and obligations created by the
Model Law also can be varied with the agreement of an affected
party.82 During its July, 1990, meeting, the UNCITRAL Working
a payment obligation and a refund under the money-back guarantee not variable by
agreement), § 4A-404(c) (right of a beneficiary to receive payment and damages from a
beneficiary's bank that has accepted a payment order not variable by either an agree-
ment or an ordinary funds-transfer system rule), and § 4A-406(d) (only an originator
and a beneficiary can agree to vary their rights with respect to discharge of an obliga-
tion of the originator to the beneficiary).
78 U.C.C. § 4A-404(c).
7 U.C.C. § 4A-501(b).
78 See id.
" See U.C.C. § 4A-405(d)-(e).
The other instances in which Article 4A authorizes funds-transfer system rules
altering the rights and obligations of system-nonparticipants are: U.O.C. § 4A-404(c)
(a beneficiary's statutory right to notice of receipt of a payment order by a beneficiary's
bank) and § 4A-507(c) (designation of a choice-of-law rule by a funds-transfer system).
A nonparticipant in a system who has not made an enforceable agreement to be
bound by a funds-transfer system rule must be given appropriate advance notice of a
rule that can affect his or her rights for the rule to be effective with respect to him or
her. See U.C.C. § 4A-507(c).
8" Article 4A only prohibits agreements varying statutory rules in a few instances.
See supra note 75 for the Article 4A restrictions upon freedom of contract.
81 A funds-transfer system rule, for example, could require that participant-banks
warrant that all prior senders, all subsequent receiving banks, and the beneficiary have
agreed to the applicability of the system's rules. The effect of this warranty would be to
allocate losses caused by a failure to obtain the agreement upon a sender or receiving
bank that failed to do so and thus to provide an incentive to obtain the agreement. To
the extent that Article 4A invalidates agreements varying statutory provisions, a war-
ranty of this nature, however, would be unenforceable. See supra note 75 for the Arti-
,cle 4A restrictions upon freedom of contract.
82 See U.N. Model Law art. 3. The exceptions are: the requirement that a secur-




Group, however, rejected a proposal by the American delegation that
would have allowed funds-transfer system rules to supersede conflicting
Model Law provisions. 8 Funds-transfer system rules consequently re-
main subject to a general Model Law provision dealing with the effect
of an agreement upon the liability of a bank. Agreements between
banks can reduce as well as increase the statutory liability of one bank
to another. A bank also can agree to increase, but not to decrease, its
liability to a nonbank originator.8 4 The Model Law, however, gener-
ally leaves a nonbank beneficiary's rights against a beneficiary's bank
to other law, including agreements and funds-transfer system rules.85
Executing banks alone are prohibited from contractually reducing their
liability to a nonbank beneficiary.8"
As an agreement between the banks participating in a funds-trans-
fer system, funds-transfer system rules per se can not reduce the statu-
tory rights of originators and beneficiaries that are not system-partici-
pants.87 Nonparticipants that are banks, however, can agree to be
bound by funds-transfer system rules reducing their rights. 8 Whether
or not a nonparticipant has agreed to be bound by the rules of a funds-
transfer system, a system's rules can increase a nonparticipant's
rights.89
Throughout the subsequent discussion of the two statutes, the ex-
tent to which their provisions can be varied by agreement and by funds-
transfer system rules should be borne in mind. Most of the statutory
provisions discussed are gap-filling rules that can be superseded by a
contrary agreement or by a conflicting funds-transfer system rule.
Insofar as legal finality and its attributes under Article 4A are
concerned, the issue of an implementing order by an executing bank
losses from unauthorized orders that comply with the procedure, U.N. Model Law art.
4(3); the money-back guarantee to a sender in the event that a funds transfer is not
completed, U.N. Model Law art. 13(2); a receiving bank's minimum liability to a non-
bank originator, U.N. Model Law art. 16(7); and an executing bank's liability to a
nonbank beneficiary, id. With respect to nonbank beneficiaries, see the discussion in
infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
83 U.N. Model Law art. 3 comment 1.
" U.N. Model Law art. 16(7).
85 See U.N. Model Law art. 9(1), art. 9 comments 2-3.
" See U.N. Model Law art. 16(6)-(7).
87 The Model Law has no counterpart to the Article 4A provisions making certain
funds-transfer system rules effective with respect to system-nonparticipants. See supra
notes 78-81 and accompanying text for discussion of the special Article 4A provisions.
88 See U.N. Model Law arts. 3, 16(7). The rights of nonbank originators and
nonbank beneficiaries, however, ordinarily can not be decreased by agreement. U.N.
Model Law art. 16(7). But see U.N. Model Law art. 9(1) (a beneficiary's bank's obli-
gation to pay a beneficiary is subject to the law governing their relationship, including
an account agreement).
89 See WORKING PAPER 49, supra note 14, at art. 16 comment 2.
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terminates a sender's unilateral power to stop payment; but acceptance
by a beneficiary's bank is required to create sender and receiver final-
ity. 90 The occurrence of interim irrevocability prior to acceptance by a
beneficiary's bank can be precluded by a contrary agreement between a
sender and. an executive bank, by a contrary funds-transfer system
rule,9" or by an originator's designation of identical execution and pay-
ment dates.9 2 Statutory sender and receiver finality, however, ordinarily
can not be altered without the agreement of the beneficiary. For a pay-
ment order to be canceled without the concurrence of the beneficiary
after acceptance by a beneficiary's bank, either a special funds-transfer
system rule must exist and settlement must fail or one of four exclusive
statutory grounds for cancellation must apply.93
The Model Law terminates a sender's unilateral power to stop
payment either upon the date of issue of an implementing order by an
executing bank or upon the date that an executing bank was instructed
to issue the order, whichever is later.9 ' In other words, an executing
bank's failure to execute upon a designated execution date extends the
revocability of an order until the date of execution. Premature execu-
tion, on the other hand, does not terminate a sender's power of revoca-
tion prior to a designated execution date.95 If no date for execution is
designated, an order remains revocable until executed, but execution
should take place upon the business day that an executing bank receives
an order. 6 Statutory irrevocablility, however, can be both created ear-
lier and postponed or precluded with the agreement of affected par-
ties.9" The same rules concerning the timing of statutory irrevocability
and its variation by a contrary agreement apply to acceptance by a ben-
eficiary's bank, which, as under the Uniform Act, creates statutory
sender finality.9" The Model Law, however, does not provide for statu-
90 U.C.C. § 4A-211(c), § 4A-402(c)-(d), § 4A-404(a).
91 See U.C.C. § 4A-211(c)(1).
" See infra notes 315-22 and accompanying text for discussion of this technique.
See U.C.C. § 4A-211(c)(2), § 4A-404(a), § 4A-405(d)-(e).
' U.N. Model Law art. 11(1).
" U.N. Model Law art. 11 comment 8.
96 See U.N. Model Law arts. 10(1), 11(1). An originator's specification of a de-
ferred payment date, however, can justify an executing bank in coordinating execution
with the payment date. U.N. Model Law art. 10(1)(b).
" The Model Law allows creation of contractual irrevocability prior to the impo-
sition of statutory irrevocability. U.N. Model Law art. 11(3). Agreements increasing
the revocability of payment orders that are statutorily irrevocable also are permitted
with the consent of affected parties. See U.N. Model Law art. 3. The parties adversely
affected by a receiving bank's consent to revocation of an order previously accepted by
the bank are discussed in infra note 179 and accompanying text.





Both statutes create a condition subsequent to any interim irrevo-
cability that occurs prior to acceptance by a beneficiary's bank. For
legal finality to exist under either statute, a funds transfer must have
been "completed." 1 °00 The common statutory definition of completion
requires acceptance of a payment order for the benefit of the benefi-
ciary by the beneficiary's bank. Both the beneficiary and the benefi-
ciary's bank must be designated by the originator.' 10 Although origina-
tors and beneficiaries are free to agree upon a later time of completion
by contract, for example when a beneficiary has unconditionally with-
drawn the credit for a payment order, it is presently uncommon to do
SO.
Both statutes also have a statutory definition of "payment" of a
beneficiary by an originator that parallels the definition of completion.
When a beneficiary's bank becomes indebted to a beneficiary for the
amount of a payment order, an originator pays a beneficiary, and, if
payment of the same amount of money would have resulted in dis-
charge, the payment discharges any pre-existing obligation for which a
transfer was made.'02 Like the statutory definition of completion, the
statutory definitions of payment and discharge can be varied by an
agreement between an originator and a beneficiary.' 03
5. FINALITY OF THE LEGAL PAYMENT OBLIGATIONS IN A
FUNDS TRANSFER UNDER ARTICLE 4A AND THE MODEL LAW
5.1. Finality of All Senders' Legal Payment Obligations Upon Com-
pletion of a Funds Transfer
Under both statutes, acceptance of a payment order by a receiving
bank obligates the sender to pay the receiving bank.10 4 If an accepted
order designates a later date when payment is due, a sender's payment
obligation does not mature until that time.'0 5 Unless a receiving bank
delays its acceptance, payment otherwise is due upon the business day
"9 See U.N. Model Law arts. 3, 9(1), art. 9 comments 1-3 (Model Law does not
deal with the account relationship between a beneficiary and a beneficiary's bank).
100 See U.C.C. § 4A-402(c)-(d); U.N. Model Law arts. 13(1), 17(1).
101 U.C.C. § 4A-104(a); U.N. Model Law arts. 13(1), 17(1).
102 U.C.C. § 4A-406(a)-(b); U.N. Model Law art. 17(2).
103 See U.C.C. § 4A-406(d); U.N. Model Law arts. 3, 17(2).
10- U.C.C. § 4A-402(b)-(c); U.N. Model Law art. 4(6).
105 U.C.C. § 4A-402(b)-(c); U.N. Model Law art. 4(6). Both statutes permit a
sender to include an "execution date" designating when an executing bank should exe-
cute an order and a "payment date" designating when a beneficiary's bank should pay
a beneficiary. U.C.C. § 4A-301(b), § 4A-401; U.N. Model Law art. 2(k),(m).
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that an order is received by the bank."' 6 Both statutes, however, make a
receiving bank's entitlement to receive and retain payment from a
sender conditional upon completion of a funds transfer. Their common
gap-filling rule defines completion as acceptance of a conforming order
by a beneficiary's bank designated by an originator.1
0 7
Under both statutes, the failure of a beneficiary's bank designated
by an originator to accept a conforming order excuses the originator's
payment obligation and entitles the originator to a refund of any pay-
ment that has been made to the originator's bank.'08 The right to refuse
future payment and obtain a refund of a prior payment comprise a
statutory "money-back guarantee"'09 to an originator that a funds
transfer either will be completed".. or legally unenforceable. Subse-
quent senders in a funds transfer receive the same money-back guaran-
tee from their receiving banks."' A receiving bank's exercise of due
care is immaterial. If a funds transfer is not completed for any reason,
a careful, as well as a careless, receiving bank must honor its money-
back guarantee. 1 2 Completion of a funds transfer in accordance with
an originator's instructions, on the other hand, gives legal finality to all
senders' payment obligations created by acceptance of their payment
orders by a receiving bank. All senders must pay their accepted orders,
the money-back guarantee is inoperative, and the beneficiary's bank
designated by the originator is obligated to pay the beneficiary in accor-
dance with the originator's instructions."
Both statutes invalidate agreements restricting the money-back
guarantee," 4 but may permit agreements expanding its applicability.""
106 Omission of a deferred date authorizes an executing bank to execute an order
upon the business day of receipt and a beneficiary's bank to pay a beneficiary upon the
business day of receipt. U.C.C. § 4A-301(b), § 4A-401; U.N. Model Law art. 10(1).
107 U.C.C. § 4A-104(a); U.N. Model Law arts. 13(1), 17(1), art. 17 comments 4-
6.
1O8 U.C.C. § 4A-402(c)-(d); U.N. Model Law art. 13(1).
10. U.C.C. § 4A-402 official comment 2; U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/328 at 11.
110 In the absence of a contractual definition of completion, both statutes have a
common gap-filling rule defining completion as acceptance of a conforming order by a
designated beneficiary's bank. See supra notes 100 & 101 and accompanying text.
1" U.C.C. § 4A-402(c)-(d); U.N. Model Law arts. 13(1), 17(1).
112 See U.C.C. § 4A-402 official comment 2 (originator's bank has a refund obli-
gation to the originator even though an intermediary bank caused a funds transfer to
fail); U.N. Model Law art. 13 comments 10-12 (the obligation of each receiving bank
to its sender is absolute).
a U.C.C. § 4A-402(c)-(d), §4A-404(a); U.N. Model Law arts. 4(6), 9(1), 13(1),
17(1).
11, U.C.C. § 4A-402(f); U.N. Model Law art. 13(1)-(2).
115 See U.C.C. § 4A-402(f); U.N. Model Law art. 3, 13(1)-(2).
U.C.C. § 4A-402(f), for example, provides:
The right of the sender of a payment order to be excused from the obliga-




Under Article 4A, a funds-transfer system rule can restrict as well as
expand the money-back guarantee to a sending bank that is a system-
participant but not to other senders.116 Under the Model Law, which
treats funds-transfer system rules like other agreements, funds-transfer
system rules at most can expand, but not restrict, the money-back guar-
antee to all senders.
1 1 7
Funds transfers that have been completed erroneously, for exam-
ple by a beneficiary's bank accepting an order naming a beneficiary
different from that designated by an originator, can involve only partial
finality of legal payment obligations. A sender that made the error, any
subsequent senders that implemented the error, and a beneficiary's
bank that accepted an order containing the error at most are bound." 8
Finally, funds transfers that miscarry so badly that no beneficiary's
bank accepts an order have no final legal payment obligations. No
under subsection (d) may not be varied by agreement.
This language clearly prohibits contractual alterations of the money-back guaran-
tee in situations in which a right of refund or excuse exists under Article 4A. Question,
however, whether contractual creation of a money-back guarantee in an instance in
which Article 4A does not create a right of refund or excuse is antithetical to Article 4A
policy and covered by the prohibition upon contractual variance.
Although U.N. Model Law art. 13(2) also precludes agreements "varying" the
money-back guarantee, the purpose is to make the statutory guarantee "mandatory."
See U.N. Model Law art. 13 comment 17. Supplementation of the mandatory guaran-
tee is not necessarily proscribed.
116 See U.C.C. § 4A-501(b), § 4A-501(b) comment 1 ("[Unless the contrary is
stated, funds transfer system rules can override provisions of Article 4A."). U.C.C. §
4A-402(f), which provides that the money-back guarantee may not be varied by agree-
ment, omits reference to variation by a funds-transfer system rule. The prohibition
upon variation of the money-back guarantee by agreement, however, would invalidate
an agreement by a nonparticipant in a funds-transfer system to be bound by a rule
restricting the money-back guarantee.
117 See U.N. Model Law art. 13(1)-(2), which appears to supersede the provisions
of art. 16(7) that allow banks contractually to vary their liability to each other but only
to increase their liability to nonbank originators and beneficiaries.
"18, Compare U.C.C. § 4A-402(c) and § 4A-402(d) (a sender's obligation to pay
his or her payment order is excused and any payment that has been made is subject to
refund as a result of failure of a designated beneficiary's bank to accept an order con-
forming to the sender's order), § 4A-404(a) (beneficiary's bank obligated to pay order it
accepts) with U.N. Model Law arts. 13(1) and 17(1) as explained by art. 17 comments
4-7 (a receiving bank is obligated by acceptance to refund payment by its sender in the
event that a beneficiary's bank designated by an originator does not accept an order
conforming to the originator's order).
Under the Article 4A formulation, which does not require that an order accepted
by a beneficiary's bank conform to an originator's order, a sender that erroneously
changes a beneficiary must pay its receiving bank if the beneficiary's bank accepts an
order conforming to that of the sender. The Model Law, on the other hand, excuses all
senders in the event that a beneficiary's bank designated by an originator does not
accept an order conforming to that of the originator. It is irrelevant under the Model
Law that the order accepted by the beneficiary's bank conforms to that of one or more
senders.
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sender is required to pay his or her order, any sender that has paid is
entitled to a refund, and no beneficiary's bank has an obligation to pay
a beneficiary." 9
5.1.1. Rationale of the Money-back Guarantee
The money-back guarantee protects an originator from loss of
principal and interest in the event that a funds transfer is not com-
pleted.'20 This protection ordinarily exists even though the lack of com-
pletion is caused by the insolvency of a bank. 2' Under both statutes, an
originator assumes the risk of insolvency of the bank selected as an
originator's bank, which provides the money-back guarantee to an orig-
inator.' 22 The first sender that instructed use of a specific intermediary
bank also bears the risk of the insolvency of the designated intermedi-
ary bank. A sender that requires use of a specific intermediary bank
has recourse only to a money-back guarantee from the designated
bank.1
23
The money-back guarantee is a central aspect of Article 4A risk-
allocation policy. The damages arising from a wholesale wire transfer
that goes awry can be substantial, and a major goal of the drafters of
Article 4A was to enable the parties to wholesale wire transfers "to
predict risk with certainty, to insure against risk, to adjust operational
and security procedures, and to price funds transfer services
appropriately.'
'1 24
In order to price funds-transfer services realistically, a bank must
be able to calculate its potential damage liability. Under American
common law, a receiving bank's breach of its contractual obligations in
a funds transfer can give rise to both foreseeable direct and consequent-
ial damages. Recoverable direct damages consist of loss of the funds
transferred, interest, and the fees for a transfer. Consequential damages
consist of all other foreseeable damages caused by breach, including lost
11 See id.
120 U.C.C. § 4A-402(d); U.N. Model Law art. 13(1) (refund with interest from
the date of payment).
'21 See Baxter & Bhala, supra note 56, at 1463 (uncommon for a bank to incur
liability as a result of the insolvency of another bank).
122 See U.C.O. § 4A-402(c)-(d); U.N. Model Law art. 13(1) (money-back guar-
antee is owed to a receiving bank's sender).
123 U.C.C. § 4A-402(e); U.N. Model Law art. 13(2). The first sender that in-
structed use of a specific intermediary bank also assumes the risk that the intermediary
bank will be prohibited by law from honoring its money-back guarantee. In the event
of a legal prohibition, the first sender is restricted to a money-back guarantee from the
designated intermediary bank. U.C.C. § 4A-402(e); U.N. Model Law art. 13(2).




profits in a collateral transaction.' 25 Direct damages typically are lost
interest and the nominal fees customarily charged for wholesale wire
transfers, whereas consequential damages can be immense. In the well-
known case of Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp.,26 for example, an
originator suffered no direct damage but incurred in excess of
$2,000,000 in consequential damages. 27 If potential liability existed for
all foreseeable consequential damages suffered by an originator because
of a failed or delayed wholesale wire transfer, a receiving bank could
have great difficulty in predicting risks and pricing its services. An
originator, moreover, should be the cheapest-cost avoider with respect
to his or her own business. The drafters of Article 4A consequently
limited the statutory liability of an executing bank to direct damages,
the money-back guarantee, and attorney's fees.'12 With respect to com-
pleted funds transfers that merely are delayed, statutory direct dam-
ages, moreover, are restricted to lost interest and attorney's fees.129 An
executing bank that is willing to do so, however, can enter into an ex-
press written contract assuming liability for additional damages, includ-
ing an originator's consequential damages.'
30
Article 4A controls a beneficiary's bank's risks in a different fash-
ion. Acceptance of a payment order by a beneficiary's bank creates lia-
bility solely to a beneficiary. No liability exists to any sender, including
an originator."3' This limitation upon the risks assumed by a benefi-
ciary's bank justifies greater liability to a beneficiary. A beneficiary's
bank ordinarily must comply with a demand by a beneficiary for pay-
ment on or after a payment date. If a demand is refused without a
reasonable doubt concerning a beneficiary's right to payment, liability
exists for all foreseeable direct and consequential damages to the
a12 See, e.g., Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951, 955 (7th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1982) (no direct damages, consequential damages included
lost profits on a ship charter that was canceled because of a delayed funds transfer as
well as the expense of arbitration and litigation that failed to set aside the cancellation).
1%6 Id.
127 Id. at 955-59 (no direct damages incurred; consequential damages disallowed
due to lack of foreseeability by intermediary bank).
128 See U.C.C. § 4A-305(a)-(e), § 4A-402(c)-(d); Baxter & Bhala, supra note 56,
at 1463 (the money-back guarantee a quid pro quo for the general rule that conse-
quential damages are not recoverable for execution errors).
For reasonable attorney's fees to be recoverable, a demand for compensation must
be made and refused before an action is brought. U.C.C. § 4A-305(e).
9 U.C.C. § 4A-305(a),(e). For reasonable attorney's fees to be recoverable, a
demand for compensation must be made and refused before an action is brought.
U.C.C. § 4A-305(e).
130 U.C.C. § 4A-305(c),(d). New Regulation J precludes Federal Reserve Banks
from agreeing to assume liability for consequential damages. Regulation J § 210.32(a),
supra note 11, at 40803.
"I' See U.C.C. § 4A-404(a).
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beneficiary.1 3 2
Under Article 4A, a funds-transfer system rule can limit the recov-
erable damages of banks participating in the system.'$$ The statutory
damages of nonparticipants, on the other hand, ordinarily cannot be
reduced. Neither the money-back guarantee to a nonparticipating
sender nor the statutory rights to payment and damages of a nonpartic-
ipating beneficiary can be restricted by an agreement or by an ordinary
funds-transfer system rule." Two special types of funds-transfer sys-
tem rules, however, can reduce the rights of nonparticipating
beneficiaries. " 5
With respect to statutory violations that are neither intentional nor
reckless, the Model Law also facilitates the prediction of risks and real-
istic pricing by receiving banks. The money-back guarantee, including
compensatory interest upon the amount of a transfer, is the remedy for
failure of completion."3 ' Compensatory interest also is the remedy for
delay by an executing bank. 3 A beneficiary's rights against a benefi-
ciary's bank, moreover, are left to other principles of law, including the
obligations and restrictions imposed by an account agreement. "
The extent to which the statutory damage rules can be displaced
by other law of an enacting jurisdiction is of great importance.. An Offi-
cial Comment states that displacement of Article 4A by implication is
unwarranted, 3 9 and neither Article 4A nor general Uniform Commer-
cial Code provisions contain a statutory authorization for displace-
ment." The Model Law, on the other hand, expressly allows supple-
132 Id.
131 See U.C.C. § 4A-305(f), § 4A-501(b) (express limitation only upon variation
by agreement).
13, U.C.C. § 4A-404(c) expressly forbids variation of a beneficiary's rights to pay-
ment and damages by either an agreement or an ordinary funds-transfer system rule.
Although U.C.C. § 4A-402(f) insulates the money-back guarantee only from variation
by agreement, funds-transfer system rules can not vary the rights of system-nonpartici-
pants unless Article 4A so provides or a nonparticipant enforceably agrees to be bound
by the rule. See U.C.C. § 4A-501(b). Article 4A, however, does not authorize a funds-
transfer system rule to vary the money-back guarantee to a nonparticipant sender and
an agreement by a nonparticipant sender to be bound by a restrictive rule would be
unenforceable. See U.C.C. § 4A-402(f), § 4A-501(b).
', See infra notes 277-90 and accompanying text.
13 See U.N. Model Law arts. 13(1), 16(1)-(5).
7 See U.N. Model Law art. 16(1)-(6).
138 See U.N. Model Law art. 16(6).
13. U.C.C. § 4A-102 official comment ("[Riesort to principles of law and equity
outside of Article 4A is not appropriate to create rights, duties and liabilities inconsis-
tent with those stated in this Article."). See also Baxter & Bhala, The Interrelationship
of Article 4A With Other Law, 45 Bus. LAW. 1485, 1486 (1990) ("When the draft-
spersons" meant for an Article 4A provision to be supplemented or displaced by another
body of law, they said so.").




mentation by common-law principles in instances in which a bank
intentionally or recklessly fails to execute a payment order or executes
an order improperly.
141
5.1.2. Loss-allocation Rules Distinguished
A sender's final legal obligation to pay his or her order arises from
completion of a funds transfer.142 Whether or not a funds transfer has
been completed, a loss-allocation rule identifies the persons that bear
the risk of loss from an adverse circumstance other than noncompletion.
Loss-allocation rules can be created either by contract or by statute.
Rather than spreading losses, the statutory loss-allocation rules in Arti-
cle 4A and the Model Law generally allocate losses to the cheapest-cost
avoider.
Under Article 4A, a sending customer and its receiving bank can
enter into an express written agreement restricting the bank's authority
to accept orders to those that "test" for authenticity and accuracy under
a contractual security procedure, 43 and also either are payable from
specified accounts or are payable to persons on a list of approved bene-
ficiaries. Whether or not a funds transfer is completed, a receiving bank
that does not comply with this type of agreement bears the risk of loss
from an unauthorized payment order. 44 A related Article 4A loss-allo-
cation rule excuses the payment obligation of a sending customer who
complies with an agreed security procedure for detection of errors and
proves that a receiving bank's compliance would have detected a mis-
taken designation of beneficiary or an erroneous duplicate order.' 45 An
Article 4A allocation of loss to a receiving bank, however, can be for-
feited by a sending customer's failure to notify the receiving bank sea-
sonably of unauthorized or erroneous orders.
When a receiving bank notifies a sending customer that it has ac-
with common-law principles that are not displaced and allows recovery of consequent-
ial and punitive damages that are specifically provided for by undisplaced rules of law.
U.C.C. § 1-103, § 1-106.
141 U.N. Model Law art. 16(8).
141 See supra notes 100 & 101 and accompanying text for the concept of
completion.
4I See U.C.C. § 4A-201 (definition of security procedure). Article 4A "custom-
ers" include banks with an account with a bank or from whom a bank has agreed to
receive payment orders. U.C.C. § 4A-105(a)(3). Every sender in a funds transfer can
have a contractual security procedure with its receiving bank. See Patrikis, supra note
32, at 236-38 (hypothetical discussion of a security procedure agreed to by an origina-
tor's bank and a beneficiary's bank that was the originator's bank's receiving bank).
144 U.C.C. § 4A-203(a)(1), § 4A-203 official comment 3.
145 U.C.C. § 4A-205. In the case of a mistake that increases the amount payable
to the beneficiary, an originator, however, remains obligated to pay the amount that he
or she intended. U.C.C. § 4A-205(a)(ii)(preamble), § 4A-205(a)(3).
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cepted an order or debited an account with respect to an order, a send-
ing customer has an Article 4A duty of ordinary care to notify the bank
of discoverable improprieties.146 At a minimum, breach of this duty can
limit a customer's entitlement to interest upon a refund. 4 If a receiv-
ing bank is liable for a loss solely because it failed to comply with an
agreed security procedure for detection of errors, breach of the duty
also can limit a customer's recovery of principal. 48 A customer, more-
over, has an independent Article 4A duty to object to a receiving bank's
receipt of payment for an order within one year after receiving notifica-
tion of the payment. 49
The Article 4A policy of allocating losses to a sending customer
who fails to notify a receiving bank of improprieties in timely fashion
can affect even a dilatory sender's right to the money-bank guarantee.
A sender that procrastinates in claiming a refund under the guarantee
forfeits entitlement to interest upon the refund for the period of unrea-
sonable delay.1 50 If an entire year goes by after a sender was notified of
a debit to his or her account with respect to a misdirected order, the
right to a refund of principal also is lost.' 5' But, in view of the large
amounts involved in wholesale wire transfers, senders ordinarily will
discover incomplete transfers in ample time to recover principal.
"Authentication" is the Model Law analogue of an Article 4A
contractual security procedure. 52 If a sending customer and a receiving
bank have agreed that the bank will accept only orders that comply
with a commercially-reasonable authentication, the customer is not
bound by the bank's acceptance of an unauthorized order that fails to
146 U.C.C. § 4A-204(a) (reasonable time for notice can not exceed 90 days), § 4A-
205(b) (reasonable time for notice can not exceed 90 days), § 4A-304 (reasonable time
for notice can not exceed 90 days), § 4A-505 (notice must be given within one year).
In what may become a standard provision in sender-receiving bank agreements,
the Federal Reserve Board's new Regulation J defines a reasonable time to give notice
under U.C.C. § 4A-204(a) and § 4A-304 as 30 calendar days after a sender receives
notice either that a payment order has been accepted or executed or that the sender's
account has been debited with respect to a payment order. Reg. J, supra note 11, 55
Fed. Reg. at p. 40802 (Section 210.28(c)).
147 U.C.C. § 4A-204(a).
148 U.C.C. § 4A-205(b).
14. U.C.C. § 4A-505.
150 U.C.C. § 4A-304, § 4A-402(d).
151 U.C.C. § 4A-505, § 4A-505 official comment.
152 Compare U.N. Model Law art. 2(0)(definition of authentication) with U.C.C.
§ 4A-201 (definition of security procedure).
Both an Article 4A "security procedure" and a Model Law "authentication" must
be created by an agreement between a sender and a receiving bank. See id. A testing
system unilaterally adopted by a receiving bank is neither an Article 4A security proce-
dure nor a Model Law authentication. See French, Unauthorized and Erroneous Pay-





"test" under the authentication. 15 3 Customers that can prove lack of
responsibility for breach of a commercially reasonable authentication
procedure also are not bound by the bank's acceptance of unauthorized
orders that do test.1
5
4
Article 4A security procedures include agreed procedures for de-
tection of errors in payment orders, which are the subject of special
Article 4A loss-allocation rules. 5 5 The Model Law excludes proce-
dures for the detection of error unrelated to identification of a sender
from its definition of "authentication."'1 56 Nevertheless, it has special
loss-allocation rules regarding agreed procedures for the detection of
errors.'57 Other Model Law loss-allocation rules have no Article 4A
counterparts. For example, if a funds transfer is delayed by misdirec-
tion of a payment order, under the Model Law the bank that receives
the misdirected order is a receiving bank and is liable for interest dur-
ing the interval between receipt of payment and notification of the error
to an identified originator. 58 Under Article 4A, only the bank to which
a payment order is addressed is a receiving bank. Other banks have no
duties with respect to a misdirected order.
15 9
The Model Law, on the other hand, has no statutory counterpart
of the Article 4A duty of a customer to give a receiving bank timely
notice of discoverable improprieties following notice of either debit of
an account or acceptance of an order. 60 The Model Law ordinarily
leaves the existence of a customer's duty to report improprieties to free-
dom of contract. However, nonbank originators, and perhaps nonbank
beneficiaries as well, seem immune from any contractual duty to report
improprieties that could reduce an originator's or beneficiary's bank's
liability to them.' 6 '
151 See U.N. Model Law art. 4(2). The test for the commercial reasonableness of
an authentication is objective. A mere agreement that an authentication is commercially
reasonable is not dispositive. U.N. Model Law art. 4(3).
'" U.N. Model Law art. 4(4).
155 U.C.C. § 4A-201, § 4A-205.
15 See U.N. Model Law art. 20).
If an algorithm used to identify a sender incorporates the terms of a payment
order, the authentication, however, also would test for errors. Any error in the content
of a payment order would cause the authentication to fail. A/CN.9/344/CORR. 1,
Comment 122 (1991) [hereinafter UNCITRAL TwENrY-SECOND SESSION REPORT].
'5 U.N. Model Law art. 4(5).
158 See U.N. Model Law arts. 7(3)-(4), 9(2), 16(3)-(4).
151 See U.C.C. § 4A-103(a)(3)-(4)(definitions of beneficiary's bank and receiving
bank), § 4A-302, § 4A-404 (obligations of receiving banks).
1"0 See supra notes 146-51 and accompanying text for discussion of the Article 4A
statutory duty.
161 See U.N. Model Law art. 16(7). With respect to nonbank beneficiaries, the
extent to which their art. 16(7) protection can be limited by art. 16(6)'s deference to an
account agreement with a beneficiary's bank is an open question.
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5.1.3. Interim Irrevocability of a Payment Order Distinguished
A final legal obligation of a sender to pay his or her order is cre-
ated by the completion of a funds transfer and extinguishment of the
money-back guarantee.'1 2 Prior to completion of a funds transfer, in-
terim irrevocability terminates a sender's unilateral power to stop pay-
ment. 6 ' Unless an originator has instructed that execution take place
upon a later date, under both statutes the issue by an originator's bank
of an implementing order terminates an originator's unilateral power to
stop payment as a matter of law."" If an execution date has been desig-
nated, either the commencement of that date or the date of actual exe-
cution by the originator's bank, whichever is later, is the terminating
event.'65 The Model Law applies the same principles to termination of
an executing bank's unilateral power to stop payment of its own pay-
ment order, and also allows a special irrevocability agreement between
a sender and an executing bank to terminate a sender's unilateral
power to stop payment.' 6 6 Article 4A, however, neither recognizes con-
tractual irrevocability nor allows an originator's designation of a later
execution date to preserve an executing bank's unilateral power to stop
payment. Notwithstanding designation of a later execution date, prema-
ture execution of a payment order by an executing bank's receiving
bank terminates the executing bank's unilateral power to stop
payment.
167
If a funds transfer ultimately is completed, interim irrevocability is
superseded by a sender's final legal obligation to make payment."", If a
funds transfer ultimately miscarries, interim irrevocability is superseded
by a sender's entitlement to an excuse and a refund under the money-
back guarantee. 9
162 U.C.C. § 4A-402(c)-(d); see U.N. Model Law arts. 13(1), 17(1).
1 3 With respect to unilateral termination of a payment order by a sender, see
U.C.C. § 4A-211(c)(1); U.N. Model Law art. 11(1),(3).
Both statutes also limit termination of payment orders by operation of law. Under
Article 4A, a payment order is not revoked by either the death or the legal incapacity of
a sender unless the receiving bank has both actual knowledge of the death or adjudica-
tion of incompetency and a reasonable opportunity to act upon this knowledge prior to
acceptance. U.C.C. § 4A-211(g). Under the Model Law, neither the death, nor the
bankruptcy, nor the incapacity of any sender, including an originator, affects the con-
tinuing validity of a previously-issued payment order. U.N. Model Law art. 11(8).
I" See U.C.C. § 4A-209(d), § 4A-211(c)(1), § 4A-301(b); U.N. Model Law arts.
2(k)-(1), 11(l).
165 See id.
166 U.N. Model Law art. 11(1),(3).
187 See U.C.C. § 4A-209(d), § 4A-211(c)(1).
166 See U.C.C. § 4A-402(c)-(d); U.N. Model Law arts. 13(1), 17(1).




a) A Sender's Unilateral Inability to Stop Payment of a Payment Order
Following Issue of an Implementing Order by an Executing Bank
In a paper-based check transaction, American law gives an issuer
of a check limited unilateral power to stop payment.110 In order to be
effective, a stop payment order must be received in a time and manner
that allows a bank upon which a check has been drawn a reasonable
opportunity to avoid paying or otherwise becoming obligated upon the
check.17 1 An effective stop payment order increases the negotiating lev-
erage of an issuer by throwing the burden of litigation upon the holder
of a check. Unless an issuer has a legal defense to the obligation to pay,
stopping payment of a check, however, creates legal liability to a
holder. 7
2
Article 4A provisions referring to "cancellation" and Model Law
provisions referring to "revocation" deal with a sender's unilateral
power to stop payment of an issued payment order.1 73 Effective cancel-
lation or revocation of an unaccepted payment order precludes subse-
quent acceptance. Effective cancellation or revocation of a previously-
accepted payment order nullifies the acceptance and all rights and obli-
gations derived from it.Y7 4 Effective cancellation or revocation, however,
affects the rights and obligations derived from a payment order alone.
The liability of an originator to a beneficiary for stopping payment is
governed by other principles of law.
The Article 4A provisions dealing with cancellation of payment
orders ordinarily can be varied both by agreement with an affected
party and by funds-transfer system rules. 7 5 System rules that conflict,
however, with the Article 4A limitations upon cancellation of a pay-
ment order that has been accepted by a beneficiary's bank are ineffec-
tive."" It is also questionable under Article 4A whether agreements or
funds-transfer system rules can make an unaccepted payment order ir-
271 U.C.C. § 4-403.
27. U.C.C. § 4-403(a).
'7 See U.C.C. § 4-403(c), § 4-403 comment 7.
173 See U.C.C. § 4A-211; U.N. Model Law art. 11. The Article 4A provisions
also apply to "amendment" of issued payment orders. Amendment is conceptualized as
a two-step process involving cancellation of an initial order and its replacement with a
new order. U.C.C. § 4A-211(e). Although the Model Law provisions do not literally
apply to amendment of issued orders, U.N. Model Law art. 11 comment 3, the Model
Law limitations upon revocation reasonably could be applied to amendment by anal-
ogy. See U.N. Model Law art. 11.
174 U.C.C. § 4A-211(e). These Article 4A provisions also are reasonable implica-
tions of Model Law revocation. See U.N. Model Law art. 11.
175 See U.C.C. § 4A-211, § 4A-501, § 4A-501 official comment 1.
176 U.C.C. § 4A-211(h).
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revocable. 177 Under the Model Law, on the other hand, an agreement
between a sender and a receiving bank can make an unaccepted order
irrevocable, 178 and can also make an order that has been accepted by a
receiving bank revocable. A beneficiary's bank, however, also must ob-
tain a beneficiary's consent in order to avoid liability to the beneficiary
for agreeing to revocation of a payment order that the bank previously
has accepted.17 9 The following discussion of the unilateral power to
stop payment assumes that there is no agreement with an affected party
and no funds-transfer system rule altering the statutory provisions.
Under both statutes, a unilateral stop payment order must be is-
sued by the sender of the payment order involved, and, unless a receiv-
ing bank chooses to waive the requirement, it must comply with an
applicable Article 4A security procedure or Model Law authentication
procedure.180 An originator's stop payment order must be issued to an
originator's bank, which, if it is not also the beneficiary's bank, in turn
must issue an order to stop payment to its receiving bank, and so on,
until the sender of a payment order to the beneficiary's bank is reached.
That sender alone has standing to issue a stop payment order to the
beneficiary's bank. 8
If a receiving bank reasonably can avoid acceptance following re-
ceipt of a unilateral stop payment order, both statutes require compli-
ance with the stop payment order.1 2 A receiving bank that receives a
timely order to stop payment and nevertheless accepts a payment order
is obligated by its acceptance but is not entitled to payment from its
sender.1 8 With respect to a stop order that is received after a payment
order has been accepted, Article 4A distinguishes between a prior ac-
ceptance by an executing bank and a prior acceptance by a beneficiary's
bank.
177 See U.C.C. § 4A-21 1(b)(notice of cancellation that is received in a time and
manner that permits a receiving bank to cancel prior to acceptance is effective).
178 U.N. Model Law art. 11(3).
17 See U.N. Model Law arts. 3, 7(2) (acceptance obligates an executing bank to
the sender of the accepted payment order who consequently can agree to vary the statu-
tory obligation imposed by acceptance); arts. 3 & 17(1) (acceptance creates indebtedness
of a beneficiary's bank to a beneficiary, who consequently must agree to variation of
that indebtedness).
180 U.C.C. § 4A-211(a); see U.N. Model Law art. 11(1)-(2), (4).
The Model Law term for a security procedure is an "authentication." See supra
notes 152-57 and accompanying text.
181 See U.C.C. § 4A-404 official comment 3. (an originator can cancel a payment
order issued to a beneficiary's bank directly only in the case of a book transfer in which
the same bank is both the originator's bank and the beneficiary's bank).
182 U.C.C. § 4A-211(b); see U.N. Model Law art. 11(1)-(2).
"I See Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Securities Settlement Corp., 710 F. Supp. 991
(D.N.J. 1989) (intermediary bank that failed to implement originator's bank's timely




Unless an originator has designated a later execution or payment
date,"' the Article 4A unilateral right to stop payment terminates upon
the acceptance of a payment order by an originator's bank.185 If a re-
ceiving bank nevertheless accedes to a request to cancel an accepted
order, unless otherwise agreed a cancelling sender is liable for any re-
sulting loss and expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees, incurred
by the bank. 8 '
Under Article 4A, for cancellation to be effective after an execut-
ing bank has accepted by issuing an implementing order, either the
executing bank must consent or a funds-transfer system rule must dis-
pense with the bank's consent. The payment order that has been issued
by the executing bank also must be canceled.18 7 For cancellation to be
effective after acceptance by a beneficiary's bank, Article 4A requires
the beneficiary's bank to consent, otherwise a funds-transfer system
rule must dispense with the bank's consent. At least one of four exclu-
sive statutory justifications for cancellation also must exist.'88 In the
absence of a statutory justification or a beneficiary's consent to cancella-
tion, a beneficiary can recover from a beneficiary's bank loss caused by
cancellation of a previously-accepted payment order. 8
An originator can extend the duration of his or her Article 4A
unilateral power to stop payment by instructing an originator's bank
not to accept before a designated date. An originator's bank that also is
an executing bank is subject to a designated execution date,'90 and an
originator's bank that also is a beneficiary's bank is subject to a desig-
nated payment date.'" Notwithstanding premature acceptance by an
originator's bank, an originator's Article 4A unilateral power to stop
payment continues until the date upon which an originator's bank was
instructed to accept. If an originator seasonably stops payment after an
184 See infra notes 190-98 and accompanying text for discussion of the effect of
designation of identical execution and payment dates on the Article 4A unilateral right
to stop payment.
'so See U.C.C. § 4A-211(c).
186 U.C.C. § 4A-211(f). A cancelling sender's obligation to indemnify a receiving
bank is not affected by the ineffectiveness of an attempted cancellation. Id.
181 U.C.C. § 4A-211(c), § 4A-211(c)(1).
188 U.C.C. § 4A-211(c), § 4A-211(c)(2).
189 See U.C.C. § 4A-21 1 (c)(preamble), § 4A-21 1 (c)(2),(h). "Except as provided in
subsection (c)(2), cancellation or amendment after acceptance by the beneficiary's bank
is not possible unless parties affected by the order agree." U.C.C. § 4A-211 official
comment 4.
Although a beneficiary's bank technically also could be liable to an originator that
did not consent to cancellation, an originator ordinarily would give consent by initiation
of a request for cancellation of an order that has been accepted by a beneficiary's bank.
180 U.C.C. § 4A-301(b).
1"1 U.C.C. § 4A-401.
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originator's bank's premature acceptance, the originator need not pay
his or her order. The originator's bank nevertheless is obligated legally
upon its acceptance by completion of the funds transfer and must at-
tempt to recover the payment from the beneficiary. 92 To the extent of
an originator's indebtedness, however, a good faith beneficiary can re-
tain the payment. 98 In order to avoid loss in this situation, an origina-
tor's bank must succeed in recovering upon the beneficiary's rights
against the originator to which it is subrogated by operation of law.
19 4
In view of their significance, deferred execution and payment dates are
not implied. A receiving bank can accept a payment order that does not
designate a date for acceptance only on the business day of receipt.
195
With the exception of a premature acceptance by an originator's
bank, Article 4A does not nullify an acceptance by a receiving bank
that occurs prior to an execution or a payment date designated by an
originator. 9 ' All executing banks, nevertheless, are obligated to issue
an order that conforms to their sender's order and thus to include any
execution and payment dates designated by the sender.197 Unless a sub-
sequent executing bank erroneously omits an execution or payment
date, by designating identical execution and payment dates an origina-
tor can therefore extend the Article 4A unilateral power to stop pay-
ment until the designated payment date."'
The Model Law terminates a sender's unilateral power to stop
payment as a matter of law upon acceptance by a receiving bank or the
commencement of the business day upon which a receiving bank has
been instructed to accept, whichever occurs later.' 9 Contractual irrevo-
cability can be created earlier,200 and statutory irrevocability can be va-
292 U.C.C. § 4A-209(d).
19' See id. (an originator's bank can recover from a beneficiary only to the extent
allowed by the law of mistake and restitution). If a beneficiary in good faith received
payment as satisfaction of a debt owed by an originator, the law of mistake and restitu-
tion allows the beneficiary to keep the money. U.C.C. § 4A-209 official comment 9;
Bank Worms v. Bank America International, 726 F. Supp. 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) affld,
928 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1991) (originator's bank that ignored originator's timely cancel-
lation not entitled to recover payment from beneficiary to whom originator was
indebted).
1" U.C.C. § 4A-209 official comment 9 (subrogation to a beneficiary's claim
against an originator is an aspect of the law of mistake and restitution).
195 U.C.C. § 4A-301(b), § 4A-401.
198 See U.C.C. § 4A-209(d), § 4A-211.
197 U.C.C. § 4A-302(a)(1).
"98 Erroneous disregard of an originator's execution or payment dates by a receiv-
ing bank other than -the originator's bank ordinarily terminates the sending bank's
power to stop payment. See infra notes 324-25 and accompanying text.
"" U.N. Model Law arts. 11(1)-(2). See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying
text for discussion of this statutory test for revocability.




ried with the agreement of the affected parties.20 1 A sender need not
settle for a seasonably revoked order and can recover any payment that
has been made.20 2 Whenever an originator effectively has revoked its
payment order, in order to avoid loss an originator's bank that unjusti-
fiably failed to comply with the revocation must recover reimbursement
for its liability upon its own payment order from the beneficiary.2"' To
the extent of the originator's indebtedness, a good faith beneficiary,
however, can retain the payment, and the originator's bank must re-
cover upon the beneficiary's rights against the originator in order to
avoid loss.
2 04
The Model Law leaves to the agreement of the parties the entitle-
ment to indemnity of a receiving bank that complies with a request for
revocation of an accepted payment order.2 0 5 An execution date can be
designated for an executing bank and a payment date can be designated
for a beneficiary's bank.20 6 The Model Law, moreover, preserves the
unilateral power to stop payment of an originator who has not agreed
to earlier contractual irrevocability until the date on which the origina-
tor's bank was instructed to accept, notwithstanding premature accept-
ance by the bank. 07 Thus, by instructing all receiving banks to accept
on the same day, an originator also can preserve the unilateral power to
stop payment under the Model Law until the designated payment date.
Although recognized by both statutes, the unilateral power to stop
payment of an unaccepted payment order has scant significance with
respect to wholesale wire transfers, which ordinarily are completed on
the day of initiation. On-line electronic transmission can be concluded
in minutes if not seconds.20 8 With respect to wholesale wire transfers,
the unilateral power to stop payment must be exercisable after accept-
ance by a beneficiary's bank in order to be effective. Both Article 4A
and the Model Law, however, terminate the unilateral power to stop
payment upon acceptance by an originator's bank unless a funds-trans-
fer system allows notice of a future transfer to be transmitted and an
201 See U.N. Model Law arts. 3, 11. As discussed in supra note 179 and accom-
panying text, an executing bank's sender is adversely affected by revocation at the re-
quest of an originator of an order previously accepted by the executing bank and a
beneficiary is adversely affected by revocation at the request of an originator of an
order previously accepted by the beneficiary's bank.
202 U.N. Model Law art. 11(5)-(6).
20. The Model Law incorporates by reference whatever subrogation rights an
originator's bank may have with respect to an originator's claims against a beneficiary.
U.N. Model Law art. 11(7).
',' See supra notes 190-94 and accompanying text.
20I See U.N. Model Law art. 11.
20' U.N. Model Law art. 2(k), (in).
207 See U.N. Model Law art. 11(1), (2).
208 See FEDWIRE REPORT, supra note 2, at 10.
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originator has instructed all receiving banks to act upon the same fu-
ture date.
With respect to payment orders that have been accepted by a bene-
ficiary's bank, Article 4A recognizes lesser finality than the Model Law
in dispensing with a beneficiary's consent to cancellation in four in-
stances, provided that a beneficiary's bank consents or a funds-transfer
system rule makes that bank's consent unnecessary.209 The Article 4A
provision rendering "ineffective" funds-transfer system rules that "con-
flict" with the four statutory justifications for cancellation of a payment
order that has been accepted by a beneficiary's bank, however, should
invalidate only rules creating additional justifications for cancellation.
Rules reducing the instances in which cancellation is possible without
the consent of a beneficiary are consistent with Article 4A policy.210
b) The Unilateral Inability of an Originator's Bank That is an Execut-
ing Bank to Revoke its Acceptance
An originator's bank that is an executing bank ordinarily will be
unable unilaterally to revoke an acceptance that terminated an origina-
tor's unilateral power to stop payment. Although the Article 4A state-
ment that "acceptance of a payment order precludes a later rejec-
tion. . . .,211 may not be dispositive, whenever an originator's bank
issues a payment order to an intermediary executing bank 2 that ac-
cepts by issuing its own payment order, as it usually will,21 3 that ac-
ceptance will end the originator's bank's unilateral power to stop pay-
ment, just as an originator's unilateral power to stop payment is ended
by an originator's bank's acceptance. This also is true with respect to
the intermediary executing banks that participate in a funds transfer.2"4
An originator's bank's specification of an execution date, however, pre-
serves its unilateral power to stop payment only under the Model Law.
Premature acceptance by an intermediary executing bank terminates an
209 U.O.C. § 4A-211(c) (preamble), § 4A-211(c)(2).
210 See U.C.C. § 4A-211(h), § 4A-211 official comments 5, 8 (a funds-transfer
system rule can "constrain" a receiving bank from agreeing to cancellation; the policy
of Article 4A is to "severely limit" cancellation of payment orders that have been ac-
cepted by a beneficiary's bank).
211 U.C.O. § 4A-210(d).
212 Acceptance by a beneficiary's bank that is an originator's bank's receiving
bank completes a funds transfer and creates final payment obligations. For interim
irrevocability to be involved, an originator's bank's payment order must have been ac-
cepted by an intermediary executing bank.
213 Acceptance by execution is anticipated by both statutes and under Article 4A it
is the only way that an executing bank can accept. See U.C.C. § 4A-209(a); U.N.
Model Law art. 6(2)(d).




originator's bank's unilateral power to stop payment under the Uni-
form Act. 15
Acceptance can occur notwithstanding a substantial variance be-
tween the terms of a payment order and an executing bank's responsive
payment order. Acceptance by an executing bank merely requires the
issue of an order "intended" to carry out an order that has been re-
ceived.216 Under both statutes, serious errors by an executing bank -
even inadvertent changes in the beneficiary, the beneficiary's bank, and
the amount- do not preclude acceptance.2 17 Issue of a materially non-
conforming order, however, simultaneously creates and breaches 218 the
obligation of an executing bank to issue a conforming order.21" 9 Under
both statutes, the components of the interim irrevocability of a payment
order- the unilateral inability of any sender, including an executing
bank, to stop payment of an accepted payment order, and the broad
statutory definition of acceptance by an executing bank- are gap-fill-
ing rules that ordinarily are variable both by agreement with an af-
fected party and by funds-transfer system rules.22 °
5.2. Finality of a Beneficiary's Bank's Legal Obligation to Pay a
Beneficiary Upon its Acceptance of a Payment Order
Both statutes have a broad definition of acceptance by a benefi-
ciary's bank that includes constructive acceptance. As a general pro-
position, acceptance occurs as a matter of law either upon the availabil-
ity of settlement and a beneficiary's bank's failure to make a timely
rejection of a payment order, or, regardless of the availability of settle-
ment, as a result of conduct by a beneficiary's bank that could cause a
beneficiary reasonably to believe that he or she can utilize the credit for
a payment order.221 For example, both a beneficiary's bank's placing
funds at the disposal of a beneficiary 22 and giving unconditional notice
215 See supra notes 196-98 and infra notes 324-25 and accompanying text.
216 U.C.C. § 4A-301(a); U.N. Model Law art. 6(2)(d).
217 See id.; U.C.C. § 4A-301 official comment 1; U.N. Model Law art. 6 com-
ment 14.
218 U.N. Model Law art. 6 comment 14.
219 See U.C.C. § 4A-302(a); U.N. Model Law art. 7(2).
210 See U.C.C. § 4A-501, § 4A-501 official comment 1; U.N. Model Law arts. 3,
16(7) (under the Model Law only an executing bank's liability to a nonbank originator
and a nonbank beneficiary can not be reduced). Nonparticipants in a funds-transfer
system ordinarily must agree to be bound by a system rule for the rule to affect their
rights. See supra notes 77-89 and accompanying text.
221 See U.C.C. § 4A-209(b); U.N. Model Law art. 8.
222 U.C.C. § 4A-209(b)(1)(i), § 4A-405(a)(i),(iii); U.N. Model Law art. 8(1)(d)-
(0. Under both statutes, this type of acceptance includes application of credit for the
order to a debt of the beneficiary. U.C.O. § 4A-209(b)(1)(i), § 4A-405(a)(ii); U.N.
Model Law art. 8(1)(g).
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of the crediting of a beneficiary's account 223 constitute constructive
acceptance.
With respect to the availability of settlement, Article 4A differs
from the Model Law in ordinarily conclusively deeming constructive
acceptance to occur if final settlement from a bank has been received
through a Federal Reserve Bank or a funds-transfer system and conse-
quently involves no significant credit risk.224 Even mistaken payment of
the wrong person by a beneficiary's bank that has received final settle-
ment from a bank through a Federal Reserve Bank or a funds-transfer
system does not prevent constructive acceptance. 225 The Model Law, on
the other hand, allows a beneficiary's bank the option of rejecting a
payment order notwithstanding the method of settlement utilized. 6
Even final credit upon the books of a central bank does not preclude
rejection.
22 7
The conduct that constitutes acceptance by a beneficiary's bank
can be varied by contract,228 and, with respect to senders that are banks
participating in the system, by funds-transfer system rules.229 On the
other hand, once acceptance by a beneficiary's bank has occurred, it
generally can not be reversed.23 0 Article 4A, nevertheless, provides
greater assurance than the Model Law that a beneficiary's bank that
has accepted an order in fact will pay a beneficiary promptly.
Under Article 4A, a beneficiary's bank is obligated to pay a bene-
ficiary on the payment date of an accepted order.2"1 An originator's
designation of a payment date is controlling as long as the designated
date is not prior to the business day on which a beneficiary's bank
receives an order. 232 The payment date otherwise is the business day on
which a payment order is received.2 3 If an accepted payment order
223 U.C.C. § 4A-209(b)(1)(ii); U.N. Model Law art. 8(1)(e).
224 U.C.C. § 4A-209(b)(2), § 4A-403(a). If a beneficiary does not have an open
account that lawfully can be credited, Article 4A, however, does not impose constructive
acceptance. U.C.C. § 4A-209(b)(2), § 4A-209(c).
225 See U.C.C. § 4A-209 official comment 6.
221 U.N. Model Law arts. 5, 8(1)(a), 8(2).
227 U.N. Model Law arts. 5(b)(iii), 8(1)(a)(ii), 8(2).
228 The Model Law, for example, expressly allows a beneficiary's bank to con-
tract that an order will be accepted upon receipt. U.N. Model Law art. 8(1)(b). Under
U.C.C. Article 4A this type of agreement would supersede the statutory definition of
acceptance. See U.C.C. § 4A-209(b), § 4A-501(a).
229 See U.O.C. § 4-209 official comment 3.
20 Compare U.C.C. § 4A-21 1 (c)(preamble) and § 4A-21 1 (c)(2) with U.N. Model
Law arts. 3 and 11(2). For discussion of the U.C.C. Article 4A exceptions to the final-
ity of acceptance by a beneficiary's bank, see infra notes 256-76 and accompanying
text.
231 U.C.C. § 4A-404(a).





either instructs payment to an account of a beneficiary or expressly re-
quires notice to a beneficiary, a beneficiary's bank also has an Article
4A obligation to notify a beneficiary of receipt of the order before mid-
night of the business day following the payment date.2 8 4 Breach of the
obligation to give notice makes a beneficiary's bank liable for interest
from the date that notice should have been given to the date that the
beneficiary learns of the bank's receipt of the order. 3 5 Unjustified fail-
ure to pay a beneficiary upon demand on or after a payment date is far
more serious. In the absence of a reasonable doubt concerning a benefi-
ciary's right to payment, a beneficiary's bank is liable for all foresee-
able direct and consequential damages caused by the unjustified refusal
of a demand for payment.236
A beneficiary's Article 4A right to notice of receipt of a payment
order can be varied both by agreement with a beneficiary and by funds-
transfer rules of which a beneficiary has notice before initiation of a
funds transfer.2"' Neither an agreement nor an ordinary funds-transfer
rule, on the other hand, can vary a beneficiary's Article 4A rights to
receive payment and to recover all foreseeable damages for unjustified
refusal of a demand for payment.
23 8
Unless an originator has specified a later payment date, the Model
Law likewise recognizes that acceptance of a payment order obligates a
beneficiary's bank to pay a beneficiary on the business day of receipt. 3 9
When payment is due, an identified beneficiary who does not maintain
an account at the bank is also to be notified that the bank is holding
funds for his or her benefit. 40 The significance of these obligations,
however, is left to other law governing the relationship between a bene-
ficiary's bank and a beneficiary, including their account agreement.
2 41
Failure of a beneficiary's bank to pay a beneficiary or to notify a bene-
ficiary of the availability of payment does not create statutory damage
liability.
2 42
23 U.C.C. § 4A-404(b).
235 Id. If a demand for interest is made and refused before an action is brought,
reasonable attorney's fees also are recoverable. Id.
*36 U.C.C. § 4A-404(a).
37 U.C.C. § 4A-404(c).
131 Id. Two special types of funds-transfer system rules, however, can negate a
beneficiary's rights to payment and to recover damages. See infra notes 277-90 and
accompanying text.
211 U.N. Model Law arts. 9(1), 10(1)(a). U.N. Model Law art. 2(m) defines a
payment date as a date specified in a payment order when funds are to be placed at the
disposal of a beneficiary.
240 U.N. Model Law art. 9(5).
241 See U.N. Model Law art. 16(6).
242 See id.
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6. EXCEPTIONS TO THE FINALITY OF LEGAL PAYMENT
OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 4A AND THE MODEL LAW
6.1. Acceptance of an Order by a Beneficiary's Bank That Conforms
to the Order of Some, But Not All, Senders
6.1.1. The General Rule - A Conforming Acceptance by a Benefi-
ciary's Bank Designated by an Originator Finalizes All Senders' Le-
gal Payment Obligations
Both statutes terminate the money-back guarantee upon accept-
ance of a conforming order by a beneficiary's bank designated by an
originator.243 A conforming order has the same beneficiary and the
same beneficiary's bank as an originator's order. A discrepancy with
respect to either element excuses an originator from paying and entitles
an originator to a refund of any payment that has been made.2 44 A
discrepancy with respect to amount, on the other hand, is not necessa-
rily material. If a designated beneficiary's bank accepts an order con-
taining an erroneous. increase in the amount of an originator's order,
the additional funds do not prevent literal compliance with the origina-
tor's instructions. The originator must pay his or her order and the
receiving bank that made the error has the burden of recovering the
excess payment from the beneficiary.245 In the case of an erroneous
reduction in the amount of an originator's order, the statutes differ.
Article 4A brings the money-back guarantee into play with respect
to an uncorrected deficiency; whereas the Model Law does not.24 6 If a
supplemental order correcting a deficiency is not issued and accepted by
a designated beneficiary's bank, Article 4A obligates an originator and
subsequent sending banks to pay only the amount of the order accepted
by the beneficiary's bank.247 The Model Law, on the other hand, obli-
242 U.C.C. § 4A-402(c)-(d); U.N. Model Law arts. 13(1), 17(1).
244 See id.
245 U.C.C. § 4A-303(a), § 4A-402(c)-(d); see U.N. Model Law arts. 13(1), 15,
17(1).
If the beneficiary is entitled to retain the payment under principles of mistake and
restitution, the receiving bank that made the error will be required to assert and to
recover upon the beneficiary's rights against the originator in order to avoid loss. See
supra notes 190-94 and accompanying text.
24 Compare U.C.C. § 4A-303(b) with U.N. Model law arts. 13(1) and 17(1),
which do not activate the money-back guarantee with respect to partially-incomplete
transfers. See also U.N. Model Law art. 17(3), which states that a transfer is to be
deemed complete notwithstanding the deduction of charges by one or more receiving
banks from the amount of the originator's order. Any right of a beneficiary to recover
deducted charges from an originator, however, is preserved. Id.




gates an executing bank that caused a deficiency to correct it and also
obligates all other executing banks to assist in the correction.2 48 In ad-
dition to liability for unpaid principal to the receiving bank that accepts
its order,2 49 an executing bank that causes a deficiency is liable to a
beneficiary for compensatory interest.
2 50
6.1.2. Acceptance by a Beneficiary's Bank of an Order Conforming
to the Order of Senders Other than an Originator
If an order accepted by a beneficiary's bank does not conform to
an originator's order but does conform to the order issued by one or
more other senders, a greater difference exists between the statutes.
The type of error that invariably creates a material nonconformity
under both statutes-a change in either the beneficiary or the benefi-
ciary's bank designated by an originator-typically is made by a send-
ing bank in issuing a payment order. A beneficiary's bank merely ac-
cepts a payment order that is issued to it.
Assume, for example, that an originator's bank made a material
error and an intermediary bank issued an order containing the error to
the beneficiary's bank, which accepted it. In this situation, the order
accepted by the beneficiary's bank would be the order of the intermedi-
ary bank that conformed to the order of the originator's bank. Because
the order of the originator would be materially different, the originator
would be entitled to an excuse and a refund under the money-back
guarantee. Both the originator's bank and the intermediary bank, how-
ever, should be required to pay their orders. This would compel the
originator's bank, the bank responsible for the error, to look to the ben-
eficiary in order to avoid loss. 51 Excuse of the originator, but not the
two sending banks, as a result of the originator's bank's error would, in
effect, substitute a funds transfer involving the error for the originator's
excused funds transfer. The substitute funds transfer, moreover, would
be complete and all senders' legal payment obligations would have fi-
nality; whereas the funds transfer initiated by the originator would be
incomplete and the originator's payment obligation would be excused
by the money-back guarantee.
Article 4A adopts a substitute-funds-transfer-with-finality analysis
in the situation described above, but the Model Law does not. Under
248 U.N. Model Law arts. 12, 14.
, U.N. Model Law art. 4(6).
250 U.N. Model Law art. 16(5).
2151 If the law of mistake and restitution allows a beneficiary to retain a payment,
the originator's bank would be dependent upon the beneficiary's rights against the orig-
inator for recovery. See supra notes 190-94 and accompanying text.
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Article 4A, even though payment by an originator is excused by the
money-back guarantee, every sending bank whose order conforms to the
order accepted by a beneficiary's bank must pay its order.2 5 2 Under the
Model Law, on the other hand, failure of a designated beneficiary's
bank to accept an order conforming to an originator's order unreasona-
bly excuses the payment obligations of all sending banks.2 3 A benefi-
ciary's bank that is not responsible for a material error in the order
that it accepts ought to be able to enforce its sender's order after paying
the beneficiary in good faith.2 "4 The Model Law, however, rejects this




6.2. Cancellation of a Payment Order After its Acceptance by a Des-
ignated Beneficiary's Bank
An important Article 4A provision identifies four situations in
which a conforming payment order that has been accepted by a desig-
nated beneficiary's bank can be cancelled without a beneficiary's con-
sent.258 Cancellation nullifies a beneficiary's bank's acceptance and all
rights and obligations based upon it.2 57 To the extent that a benefi-
ciary's bank's acceptance of a conforming order completed a funds
transfer, cancellation of the accepted order triggers the money-back
guarantee, releasing all senders from a legal obligation to pay their or-
ders and entitling them to a refund of any payment that has been
made. 58 Cancellation also reinstates an obligation of an originator to a
beneficiary that had been discharged by the initial completion of a
funds transfer.259 Cancellation of an order previously accepted by a
beneficiary's bank requires either the bank's consent or a funds-transfer
system rule authorizing cancellation regardless of the bank's consent,
plus a statutory justification for cancellation.260 The four exclusive stat-
111 See U.C.C. § 4A-303(c), § 4A-402(c)-(d). See also U.C.C. § 4A-402 official
comment 2.
251 U.N. Model Law arts. 13(1), 17(1).
24 If a beneficiary is entitled to retain a payment under the law of mistake and
restitution, a beneficiary's bank is dependent upon subrogation to a beneficiary's rights
against an originator in order to avoid loss. See supra notes 190-94 and accompanying
text.
211 U.N. Model Law art. 13(1)-(2).
2-56 U.C.C. § 4A-211(c)(2).
2- U.C.C. § 4A-211(e).
258 U.C.C. § 4A-402(c)-(d).
259 U.C.C. § 4A-406(a)-(b).
260 U.C.C. § 4A-211(c)(preamble), §4A-211(c)(2). The provision refers to
"amendment" as well as to "cancellation" of an order that has been accepted by a
beneficiary's bank. U.C.C. art. 4A, however, treats amendment as a derivative of can-
cellation. Amendment is a two-step process consisting of cancellation of an initial order




utory justifications are lack of authorization for an accepted order by a
purported originator and the following three types of mistake by a
sender: issue of a duplicate of a previously-issued order; issue of an
order designating a beneficiary who is not entitled to receive payment
from an originator; and issue of an order requiring payment of a
greater amount than a beneficiary is entitled to receive from an
originator.2 '
An Official Comment describes this special provision as a "severe
limitation" upon cancellation of an order that has been accepted by a
beneficiary's bank. 62 Conflicting funds-transfer system rules are inef-
fective,26 and the willingness of a beneficiary's bank to disregard the
statute is immaterial.26' Consent by a beneficiary is necessary to pre-
clude a beneficiary's bank's damage liability to the beneficiary for dis-
regard of the statutory limitations.265
Although the Model Law does not allow cancellation of an order
that has been accepted by a beneficiary's bank, 66 cancellation can be
warranted. Whether or not the beneficiary was involved in the fraudu-
lent scheme, 8 7 a purported originator, for example, should be able to
forestall swindlers by obtaining cancellation of an unauthorized order
that initiated a fraudulent funds transfer. A remedy also should be
available to prevent a windfall to a beneficiary from a duplicate order.
The other instances in which Article 4A allows cancellation of orders
that have been accepted by a beneficiary's bank, however, could be
abused by an originator. For example, the article is too open-ended to
allow cancellation of orders that mistakenly provide for payment "to a
beneficiary not entitled to receive payment from the originator" or "in
an amount greater than the amount the beneficiary was entitled to re-
261 U.C.C. § 4A-211(c)(2). Because a beneficiary may be involved in the fraudu-
lent use of an unauthorized order, any order that does not bind a purported originator
under principles of agency can justify revocation of a beneficiary bank's acceptance.
The elaborate U.C.C. Article 4A provisions otherwise making certain unauthorized
payment orders effective against a customer of a receiving bank do not apply. See
U.C.C. § 4A-202(a)-(b), § 4A-211(c)(2), § 4A-211(c)(2) official comment 4, case 1.
" U.C.C. § 4A-211 official comment 8.
26 U.C.C. § 4A-211(h).
26 See U.C.C. § 4A-211(c)(2).
285 See U.C.C. § 4A-211 official comments 4, 8 (cancellation of an acceptance by a
beneficiary's bank affects the rights of both an originator and a beneficiary). An origi-
nator's consent, however, is implicit in his or her request for cancellation.
26 See supra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
267 Several reported cases in the United States have involved use of unauthorized
payment orders to pay persons who innocently had contracted to sell valuable property
to the schemers. See, e.g., Bradford Trust Co. v. Texas American Bank-Houston, 790
F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1986) (two con artists used unauthorized payment order to pay
innocent seller of rare coins and gold bullion).
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ceive from the originator."2 "
The illustrations in the Official Comment involve an originator
who mistakenly designated Y as beneficiary when he or she meant X,
and an originator who mistakenly instructed payment of $1,000,000
when he or she meant $10,000.2"I If an originator decided that goods
which he or she had contracted to purchase from a beneficiary were
overpriced, would this belief also justify cancellation of an accepted or-
der upon the ground that the originator mistakenly believed that the
beneficiary was entitled to greater payment? The examples in the Offi-
cial Comments suggest not. 7 0 Under Article 4A, "entitled" means "le-
gally entitled." "Legal entitlement," however, often is unclear. An orig-
inator's legal rationalization for a change of mind should not justify
cancellation of an order that has been accepted by a beneficiary's bank.
The importance of the overbreadth in the statutory justifications
for cancellation is affected by the frequency with which an originator is
likely to be able to obtain cancellation upon improper grounds. Al-
though Article 4A allows cancellation of an accepted order after pay-
ment of a beneficiary,271 it is unlikely that a beneficiary's bank would
readily assume the burden of recovering payment from a beneficiary or
that a funds-transfer system rule would require a beneficiary's bank to
do so. Cancellation is most likely in the interval between acceptance by
a beneficiary's bank and payment of a beneficiary. In the absence of a
designated payment date, the payment date of an order, however, is
deemed to be the business day of receipt by a beneficiary's bank, 72 and
only the sender who issued the order to the bank has standing to re-
quest cancellation.27 3 Unless a beneficiary's bank also is an originator's
bank, the time that it can take to process an originator's request for
cancellation through the executing banks participating in a funds trans-
fer decreases the likelihood that a request can be made by a benefi-
ciary's bank's sender before payment of a beneficiary.
There are additional reasons for believing that cancellation by an
originator will not be routine. A beneficiary's bank may have no way of
knowing whether or not an originator in fact has a statutory basis for
cancellation and ordinarily will be reluctant to antagonize a beneficiary
that is its customer either by denying funds or by demanding their re-
turn.2 74 For the same reasons, a funds-transfer system rule is unlikely
26 U.C.C. § 4A-211(c)(2)(ii)-(iii).
26 U.C.C. § 4A-211 official comment 4, cases 3-4.
270 See id.
271 U.C.C. § 4A-211(c)(2)(last sentence).
272 U.C.C. § 4A-401.
278 U.C.C. § 4A-211(a).




to dispense with a beneficiary's bank's consent.
Cancellation of duplicate orders mistakenly issued by an executing
bank is more likely to be feasible. The issue of a duplicate order by an
executing bank can be more satisfactorily and promptly established
than an originator's legal rights.21 5 An executing bank that issues a
duplicate order also will be closer to a beneficiary's bank in the chain
of participants in a funds transfer than an originator.
The statutory justifications for cancellation involving a benefi-
ciary's lack of legal entitlement to payment are vague. However, the
general inability of originators to invoke them and beneficiaries' banks'
general unwillingness to accede to requests made by originators in
timely fashion diminish the significance of this problem. The instances
in which Article 4A allows cancellation by an originator nevertheless
should be restricted. The statutory text, for example, gives insufficient
protection to beneficiaries in funds transfers in which the same bank is
both an originator's bank and a beneficiary's bank and consequently is
more likely both to receive a seasonable stop payment order from an
originator and to be willing to comply with the order. A preferable
approach would be to limit the instances in which an originator can
cancel an order that has been accepted by a beneficiary's bank to unau-
thorized orders and duplicate orders.
2 76
6.3. Agreements and Funds-Transfer System Rules Limiting a Bene-
ficiary's Statutory Right to Payment of an Order Accepted by a Benefi-
ciary's Bank
Under Article 4A, a beneficiary's right to payment of an order
that has been accepted by a beneficiary's bank can be varied by two
special types of funds-transfer system rules.2 77 One type of special rule
can make a payment to a beneficiary provisional upon a beneficiary
bank's receipt of settlement for an accepted order.278 In order to be
effective, the rule must require that both an originator and a benefi-
ciary have notice before a funds transfer is initiated that payment by
275 An originator's claim to have issued a duplicate order, on the other hand,
would place the originator's legal rights at issue. The underlying transaction could have
entitled the beneficiary to two identical payments.
278 If senders are given a reasonable time to check for duplicate orders prior to
imposition of finality, an unauthorized order should be the sole exception. See infra
notes 328-30 and accompanying text.
Restriction could be accomplished by a funds-transfer system rule as well as a
statutory amendment. See supra notes 209-10 and accompanying text.
277 See U.C.C. § 4A-404(c), § 4A-405(d)-(e), § 4A-501(a).
A beneficiary's right to payment, however, can not be varied by either an agreement or
an ordinary funds-transfer system rule. Id.
278 U.C.C. § 4A-405(d).
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the beneficiary's bank will be provisional. A beneficiary, a beneficiary's
bank, and an originator's bank also must agree to be bound by the
rule.279 If this type of rule is effective and a beneficiary's bank does not
receive settlement, the beneficiary's bank's acceptance is deemed nulli-
fied and the beneficiary must refund any payment that has been
received.2"'
The second type of special rule can be adopted by a funds-transfer
system that nets obligations multilaterally among system-participants
who also have agreed to share losses arising from a participant's inabil-
ity to settle its net obligations.281 In the event that the loss-sharing
agreement fails to cover the defaults of system-participants, the special
rule can nullify the acceptance, and all rights and obligations arising
from the acceptance, of a beneficiary's bank that does not receive full
settlement.28 2
Nullification of a beneficiary's bank's acceptance by either of these
special funds-transfer system rules nullifies the legal finality of senders'
payment obligations that had been created by that acceptance.2 83 Any
initial discharge of an originator's debt to a beneficiary also is
nullified.2"4
Each of the special funds-transfer system rule exceptions to the
finality of legal payment obligations accommodates a particular Ameri-
can payment system. The "provisional payment" exception conforms to
the understanding that payment is provisional in Automated Clearing
House (ACH) batch transfers,28" whereas the "netting and loss-shar-
ing" exception reflects the rules of the New York City CHIPS funds-
transfer system. 86 The "provisional payment" exception, however, is
overbroad. It unnecessarily covers individually-processed wholesale
wire transfers8 7 as well as ACH batch transfers," 8 which typically
279 Id.
280 Id.
28L U.C.C. § 4A-405(e). Netting involves an agreement by banks participating in
a funds-transfer system to settle payments among themselves on a net basis. Nelson,
Settlement Obligations and Bank Insolvency, 45 Bus. LAW. 1473, 1479 n.16 (1990).
282 U.C.C. § 4A-405(e).
28 See U.C.C. § 4A-405(d)-(e) (§ 4A-405(e) states that nullification triggers all
senders' money-back guarantees, whereas § 4A-405(d) inexplicably does not).
284 See id. (both provisions cancel any payment from an originator to a
beneficiary).
285 U.C.C. § 4A-405 official comment 3. Multiple ACH payment instructions are
combined in a single magnetic tape or comparable electronic device. See U.C.C. § 4A-
107 official comment 2.
288 U.C.C. § 4A-405 official comment 4. CHIPS has netted participants' payment
obligations for some time. The CHIPS loss-sharing rule became effective in 1990. Nel-
son, supra note 281, at 1478.
287 For discussion of the characteristics of wholesale wire transfers, see supra




involve consumer transactions.2"9 In order to protect both sender and
receiver finality, wholesale wire transfers should be excluded from the
"provisional payment" exception by either an amendment or a funds-
transfer system rule. The "netting and loss-sharing" exception, on the
other hand, is a hypothetical doomsday rule that never in fact should
nullify sender and receiver finality. In the absence of a financial disas-
ter, the CHIPS loss-sharing agreement should prove adequate. 90
The comparable Model Law provisions allow a beneficiary to
agree to modification of the right to payment of an order that has been
accepted by a beneficiary's bank. 91 The Model Law, on the other
hand, does not authorize funds-transfer system rules to impair finality
with respect to nonparticipants in a funds transfer system that have not
made an enforceable agreement to be bound by the rules.
292
The most troublesome exceptions to the legal finality of payment
obligations in both statutes are the two instances in which Article 4A
allows an originator to obtain cancellation of a payment order that has
been accepted by a beneficiary's bank by claiming that a beneficiary
was not legally entitled to payment. Although it will be practically dif-
ficult for an originator to abuse these exceptions, they negate all final-
ity, even good-money-settlement finality, and invite needless second-
guessing of an originator's decision to make a wholesale wire transfer
for possibly as long as a year. 93 Originators should be precluded from
utilizing both vague exceptions either by a statutory amendment or a
funds-transfer system rule. 9 The extension to wholesale wire transfers
of funds-transfer system rules that make payment to a beneficiary con-
ditional upon a beneficiary's bank's receipt of final payment also is ob-
jectionable, but less important. Unless settlement fails, sender finality,
for example, is not affected. 95
28 See U.C.C. § 4A-405(d).
289 U.C.C. art. 4A, supra note 3, prefatory note at 477-78. See D. Baker & R.
Brandel, THE LAw oF ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFER SYSTEMS 3-10 (1988) (ACH
funds transfers are neither as fast nor as secure as individually-processed FEDWIRE
and CHIPS funds transfers).
290 Patrikis, supra note 32, at 253.
191 See U.N Model Law arts. 3, 9(1), 16(6).
192 See id; U.N. Model Law art. 3 comment 1.
293 There is no express statute of limitations with respect to assertion of the excep-
tions. A customer's U.C.C. art. 4A duties to report discoverable improprieties within a
reasonable time and to object to debit of an account within one year after the customer's
receipt of notice reasonably identifying the order would seem applicable. See supra
notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
29 See supra notes 266-76 and accompanying text.
293 See supra notes 278-80 and accompanying text.
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7. ANOTHER VIEW: JAPANESE APPROACHES TO FINALITY
7.1. The Present Japanese Legal Context
As befits its highly-developed economy, Japan has three domestic
electronic funds-transfer systems for yen-denominated transfers - the
BOJ-NET, Gaitame-Yen, and Zengin systems. BOJ-NET is managed
by The Bank of Japan (BOJ), the Japanese central bank; whereas the
Gaitame-Yen and Zengin systems are managed by the Tokyo Bankers'
Association.29 6
There presently is no specialized Japanese legislation governing
wholesale wire transfers. Disputes are resolved on the basis of general
civil-law principles, contracts to the extent that they exist, and funds-
transfer system rules that were not necessarily developed with dispute
resolution in mind.297 Moreover, a noteworthy BOJ-NET rule allows
postponement of the finality of wholesale wire transfers.
7.2. BOJ-NET "New Transfer Orders in the Opposite Direction"
BOJ-NET became operational as a funds transfer system in Octo-
ber, 1988. BOJ-NET provides two types of funds transfer service in
which BOJ-NET functions merely as a funds-transfer system directly
linking an originator's bank and a beneficiary's bank and does not issue
its own payment order. There are no intermediary banks in BOJ-NET
funds transfers."' One BOJ-NET service enables private financial in-
stitutions to settle both individual and aggregate credits and debits
through entries to their BOJ accounts. This service permits both a
credit transfer to any BOJ account holder, which is initiated by a
payor, and a debit transfer between offices of a sender, which is initi-
ated by a payee.2 99 The second type of service, which is known as
298 BANK OF JAPAN REPORT No. 1, JAPANESE TRANSFER SYSTEMS IN THE ERA
OF FINANCIAL DEREGULATION AND GLOBALIZATION at 18-22 (July 1989) [hereinaf-
ter BOJ REPORT No. 1].
In addition to the domestic Japanese electronic funds transfer systems for yen-
denominated transfers, the Tokyo branch of Chase Manhattan Bank operates a Tokyo
Dollar Clearing System in which the dollar-denominated obligations of participating
banks are netted in Tokyo and then settled in New York through CHIPS transfers. See
Toyama, Problems of Risk in International Electronic Fund Transfer Systems, 2 FI-
NANCIAL SERVICES YEARBOOK 129, 138-40 (1989).
21 See BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, LARGE-VALUE FUNDS
TRANSFER SYSTEMS IN THE GROUP OF TEN COUNTRIES May, 1990 at 65 [hereinaf-
ter cited as LARGE-VALUE FUNDS TRANSFERS] ("The legal framework for BOJ-NET
is provided through a private contract between the Bank of Japan (operator) and the
participants. The actual operation is managed in accordance with regulations and oper-
ating manuals drafted by the Bank of Japan.".).
299 See id. at 67-68.




"funds transfer with customer information," is limited to credit trans-
fers between BOJ accounts initiated by on-line banks, and presently
has a minimum transferable amount of Yen 300,000,000.30' In addition
to identifying an originator's bank, a beneficiary's bank, and an
amount, a transfer order with customer information names both the
customer of the originator's bank who requested the transfer and the
beneficiary, also identifying the beneficiary's account by type and
number.301
With respect to both BOJ-NET funds-transfer services, one of the
three authorized hours for settlement upon either BOJ-NET's business
day of receipt or BOJ-NET's next business day also can be, and typi-
cally is, selected by an originator's bank.30 A beneficiary's bank, how-
ever, must agree in advance to receive a designated-time transfer.3 03
Both services are subject to the prohibition upon daylight overdrafts in
BOJ accounts.304 Deferred payment is not possible. Settlement must
take place on a date and hour designated by an originator's bank. If
neither a date nor an hour for settlement are designated, BOJ-NET
settles in conjunction with notifying a beneficiary's bank of an order.
3 0 5
Because both types of service typically are utilized on an on-line basis,
a beneficiary's bank ordinarily receives notice of a transfer at approxi-
mately the time that the notice is sent.306
BOJ-NET operating procedure permits cancellation of notice of
an executory transfer order prior to a designated time for settlement by
means of a "new transfer order in the opposite direction." ' 7 A benefi-
ciary's bank that has agreed to accept a designated-time settlement has
no choice and must comply with a timely request for a new transfer
order in the opposite direction by an originator's bank. A beneficiary's
consent likewise is irrelevant. A settlement between a beneficiary's bank
and a beneficiary consequently would not affect an originator's bank's
privilege to require a new transfer order in the opposite direction. The
requirement that an originator's bank obtain a beneficiary's bank's ad-
vance consent to a transfer with a designated-time for settlement en-
sures notice to a beneficiary's bank of the transfers in which a benefi-
300 Id. at 12-13.
301 Id. at 12, 50.
302 Id. at 10-11. BOJ-NET limits the hours for settlement that can be designated
to 9:00, 13:00, and 15:00. Id.
101 Originator's and beneficiary's banks are expected to agree upon either immedi-
ate settlement or settlement at a designated time. Id. Immediate settlement is the de-
fault choice.
"" See id. at 7.
305 Id. at 10-11.
SO6 See id. at 10, 12.
307 Id. at 12.
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ciary should not be given unconditional credit prior to the time
designated for settlement by an originator's bank.
BOJ-NET policy with respect to a new transfer order in the op-
posite direction requires a beneficiary's bank to cancel an executory
transfer order upon an originator's bank's request prior to a designated
time for settlement. The reason for the request is irrelevant. Because an
originator's bank can be expected to act in accordance with an origina-
tor's wishes, the new transfer order in the opposite direction procedure
effectively allows an originator to retain a unilateral power to cancel an
executory transfer order until a designated time for settlement. A bene-
ficiary that wishes to obtain earlier finality must bargain with an origi-
nator for a transfer order that does not designate a time for settlement
and will be settled immediately by BOJ-NET.
The Zengin System, a Japanese domestic funds-transfer system
operated by the Tokyo Bankers Association,308 has a different finality
policy. In the Zengin System, there also are no intermediary banks in a
funds transfer. Like BOJ-NET, the Zengin System is a funds-transfer
system that communicates directly between an originator's and a bene-
ficiary's bank without issuing its own payment order. A beneficiary's
bank credits a beneficiary's account on the business day that a payment
instruction is received but extends credit to an originator's bank, which
does not settle until the next business day. Settlement is effected by
calculating each participating bank's bilateral debit and credit position
with respect' to every other participating bank, netting, and settling the
balances through entries to BOJ reserve accounts.30 9 If an originator's
bank should be unable to settle, BOJ would provide settlement finality
by paying the beneficiary's bank. BOJ would be reimbursed by liqui-
dation of the collateral that the originator's bank is required to have
deposited for that purpose, and, to the extent that the collateral should
prove insufficient, by contributions from other participating banks
under a loss-sharing arrangement.3 10
Zengin System transfers can be revoked notwithstanding receipt of
a payment instruction by a beneficiary's bank. 11 At an originator's re-
quest, an originator's bank can send a "revoke request message." If a
beneficiary h~s not yet received final credit, a beneficiary's bank must
respond with an "acceptance and funds return" message. A beneficiary
who has received final credit, however, must consent for revocation to
308 BOJ REPORT No. 1, supra note 296, at 18.
309 Id.
310 Id. at 18-19.





Like a BOJ-NET new transfer order in the opposite direction,
prior to a beneficiary's receipt of final credit to his or her account, the
Zengin System's revoke request procedure precludes sender finality.
Because a beneficiary's consent to revocation is required after a benefi-
ciary's bank has granted a beneficiary final credit, 13 the revoke request
procedure, however, does not inhibit the granting of final credit to a
beneficiary. By giving an originator's bank an unqualified right of rev-
ocation, the BOJ-NET transfer order in the other direction procedure,
on the other hand, does deter a beneficiary's bank from granting a ben-
eficiary final credit until the time designated for settlement by an origi-
nator's bank. 14
The finality policy of Article 4A and the Model Law, particularly
the latter, is more comparable to the finality policy of BOJ-NET than
to the finality policy of the Zengin System. Specification of identical
execution and payment dates can be utilized under Article 4A and the
Model Law to achieve the equivalent of a BOJ-NET designated day
for settlement.31 5 If an originator's bank also is a beneficiary's bank,
which is an atypical situation in the United States,31 an originator's
unilateral power to order a beneficiary's bank to stop payment is pre-
served explicitly by a designated payment date. Prior settlement be-
tween a beneficiary's bank and a beneficiary is irrelevant. 1 An origi-
nator's bank that is an executing bank is required to comply with a
designated execution date rather than a payment date."18 But both stat-
utes allow an executing bank to be guided by a designated payment
s See id.
313 Although Zengin System revoke request messages can be sent even after calcu-
lation of the interbank settlement for a transfer, an originator's bank loses the power to
send a unilateral stop payment order prior to calculation of the interbank settlement
when a beneficiary receives unconditional credit for a Zengin transfer order.
Si' Because a beneficiary's bank must comply with a request for a new transfer
order in the opposite direction that is made prior to a designated time for settlement,
the suggestion in the BOJ-NET rules that new transfer orders in the opposite direction
should be confined to correction of mistakes does not limit an originator's bank's power
to send a unilateral stop payment order.
315 Although U.C.C. Article 4A and the U.N. Model Law refer to an "execution
date" and a "payment date" in the sense of the day upon which a receiving bank is to
act, (see U.C.C. § 4A-301(b), §4A-401; U.N. Model Law art. 2(k), (in)), and the
BOJ-NET rule also allows designation of one of three possible hours for settlement,
see supra note 302 and accompanying text, a funds-transfer system rule could author-
ize designation of an hour for transfer under the two statutes. See U.C.C. § 4A-501(b);
U.N. Model Law art. 16(7).
31' Patrikis, supra note 32, at 227.
317 See supra notes 192-94, 199-204 and accompanying text.
SI1 U.C.C. § 4A-301(b); U.N. Model Law art. 10(1)(a).
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date if an execution date is not also designated. 31" An executing bank,
moreover, is obligated to issue an order that conforms to the order be-
ing executed 20 so that an order issued by an originator's bank that is
an executing bank should contain the execution and payment dates that
were designated by an originator,3 21 as should the orders issued by any
subsequent intermediary executing banks. 22 Unless an error is made
by an executing bank, a beneficiary's bank consequently should be in-
structed by its sending bank to comply with the payment date desig-
nated by an originator and should not accept the payment order that it
receives prior to that date. Designating the same date as both the exe-
cution date for all executing banks and the payment date for a benefi-
ciary's bank accordingly permits an originator to preserve the unilateral
power to stop payment until a designated payment date.
Premature acceptance by an executing bank or a beneficiary's
bank does not alter an originator's unilateral power to stop payment
under the Model Law. In the absence of contractual irrevocability, the
Model Law preserves the power to revoke until a designated execution
or payment date even though acceptance occurs earlier. 23 Under Arti-
cle 4A, premature acceptance by any receiving bank other than an orig-
inator's bank, on the other hand, terminates an originator's unilateral
power to stop payment.3 24 A funds-transfer system rule can negate the
significance of premature acceptance by an executing bank, but not by
a beneficiary's bank.3 25 Use of a BOJ-NET designated-time settlement
or designation of identical Uniform Act and Model Law execution and
payment dates in order to preserve an originator's unilateral power to
stop payment until settlement essentially replaces both sender finality
and receiver finality with good-money settlement finality. 2 ' BOJ-NET
and the Model Law recognize no exceptions to the finality of a good-
money-settlement. Article 4A, however, allows cancellation of an ac-
ceptance by a beneficiary's bank in the four situations that have been
319 See U.C.C. § 4A-301(b); U.N. Model Law art. 10(1)(b).
320 U.C.C. § 4A-302(a)(1); U.N. Model Law art. 7(2).
321 See id.
322 Id.
323 U.N. Model Law art. 11(1)-(2).
324 See U.C.C. § 4A-209(d), § 4A-209(d) official comment 9, which make ineffec-
tive only premature acceptance by an originator's bank.
321 See U.C.C. § 4A-209(d), § 4A-211(c)(2), § 4A-211(h), § 4A-501(b) (unless
U.C.C. Article 4A provides otherwise, a funds-transfer system rule can supersede the
statute with respect to the rights and obligations of banks participating in the system
and also can indirectly affect a system-nonparticipant; funds-transfer system rules,
however, are prohibited from increasing the instances in which orders that have been
accepted by a beneficiary's bank can be cancelled).





previously discussed, notwithstanding a prior good-money settlement.3 27
The BOJ-NET approach is a credible alternative to three of these
Article 4A exceptions to the finality of an acceptance by a beneficiary's
bank - the existence of a duplicate order, a beneficiary's lack of enti-
tlement to any payment, and overpayment of a beneficiary."2 8 In lieu of
these statutory exceptions, BOJ-NET allows an originator a maximum
of two business days 29 to check for transmission errors and for
problems in the transaction that gave rise to a transfer. Delaying ac-
ceptance by a beneficiary's bank, on the other hand, should not affect a
purported originator's ability to obtain cancellation of an unauthorized
order - the fourth Article 4A exception to finality.330 Notwithstanding
the exercise of due care, a purported originator may not discover an
unauthorized order within two business days of its receipt by a benefi-
ciary's bank.
8. CONCLUSION
As has been discussed, if a deferred payment date has not been
fixed and a beneficiary's bank designated by an originator has accepted
a conforming order, both Article 4A and the Model Law impose sender
finality, but only Article 4A imposes substantial receiver finality.3 ' An
order accepted by a beneficiary's bank designated by an originator,
moreover, is conforming if it names the beneficiary designated by an
originator. A deviation from the amount of an originator's payment or-
der does not necessarily preclude finality. 2 Article 4A also reasonably
extends both sender and receiver finality to situations in which a desig-
nated beneficiary's bank accepts an order conforming to that of senders
other than an originator. Even though an originator is excused from
liability by the money-back guarantee, subsequent senders whose orders
conform to the order accepted by a beneficiary's bank should be
bound.
3 33
Under both statutes, designation of identical execution and pay-
ment dates by an originator can preserve an originator's unilateral
327 See supra notes 256-76 and accompanying text.
381 See U.C.C. § 4A-211(c)(2).
The day designated for settlement must be either the BOJ-NET business day
upon which a transfer order is sent or BOJ-NET's next business day. See supra notes
302-03 and accompanying text.
330 U.C.C. § 4A-211(c)(2).
331 See supra notes 104-13, 231-42 and accompanying text.
S'3 An erroneous reduction in the amount of an originator's payment order that is
not corrected, however, can result in pro tanto reduction of an originator's liability. See
supra notes 243-50 and accompanying text.
333 See supra notes 251-55 and accompanying text.
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power to stop payment until the payment date." 4 In the absence of a
contrary agreement, identical instructions concerning execution and
payment and contractual irrevocability to the extent that it is effec-
tive,"35 both statutes, however, terminate the unilateral power to stop
payment upon acceptance by an originator's bank. 8'
Both statutes also differentiate between the time at which a sender
loses the power to issue a unilateral stop payment order and the time at
which a sender's legal payment obligation becomes final. If interim ir-
revocability exists, it occurs first and terminates when a sender's legal
payment obligation either becomes final or is excused by the money-
back guarantee.337 Both statutes base interim irrevocability upon issue
of an implementing order by an originator's bank that is an executing
bank, but the Model Law also allows a special agreement between a
sender and an executing bank to create interim irrevocability. 8" Al-
though both indicia of interim irrevocability are objective circumstances,
it ordinarily will be easier for an originator who has not agreed to the
irrevocability of his or her payment order 39 to ascertain whether an
originator's bank has properly executed an order than whether an in-
termediary executing bank has agreed to irrevocability with its sender.
Both statutes also base the legal finality of all senders' payment obliga-
tions upon the objective circumstances that constitute acceptance by a
beneficiary's bank.340 Prior American and United Kingdom judicial de-
cisions, on the other hand, applied conflicting, nonuniform tests con-
cerning the relationship between interim irrevocability and the legal fi-
nality of senders' payment obligations, and also concerning the events
that created interim irrevocability and sender finality."4'
Neither statute requires either settlement finality or a good-
money-settlement for legal finality. Article 4A, however, negates all ini-
tial statutory finality with respect to a beneficiary's bank that is a par-
ticipant in a funds-transfer system that nets obligations multilaterally
and has a loss-sharing agreement that fails to achieve systemic settle-
See supra notes 315-25 and accompanying text.
s Interim contractual irrevocability is recognized only by the Model Law. See
supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
338 U.C.C. § 4A-211(c); U.N. Model Law art. 11(1)-(2).
837 See supra notes 162-69 and accompanying text.
38s See supra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
"I An agreement that a payment order is irrevocable is meaningful only under
the Model Law. See id.
"0 See supra notes 221-27 and accompanying text.
341 See Geva, The Evolving Law of Payments by Wire-An Outsider's View of
Draft UCC Article 4A, 14 CAN. Bus. L.J. 186, 188-93, 226 (1988) (draft Article 4A




ment."4' Both statutes also allow a funds-transfer system rule to alter
the statutory definition of acceptance to make receipt of a good-money
settlement a prerequisite to acceptance by a beneficiary's bank. 4" With
respect to funds-transfer systems that allow the transmission of an exec-
utory order for a transfer upon a future business day,"4" BOJ-NET's
experience with its new transfer order in the opposite direction proce-
dure validates a funds-transfer system rule that, except with respect to
unauthorized orders, allows originators to limit future transfers to
good-money-settlement finality.' 45
The legal rules governing wholesale wire transfers should be as
precise and predictable as possible, but finality is not a prerequisite of
clarity. As long as the receiving banks and the beneficiary involved have
adequate notice of the choice that has been made and can take precau-
tions to avoid loss, an unambiguous lack of finality for a relatively short
period is arguably preferable to Article 4A's statutory "finality", sub-
ject as it is to unwise statutory exceptions. Because a funds-transfer
system rule that limits the statutory justifications for cancelling an or-
der that has been accepted by a beneficiary's bank is consistent with
Article 4A policy, 46 this type of rule could be adopted under the pre-
sent Official Text of Article 4A in order to cure the overbroad statutory
exceptions.
Model Law finality policy also should be reconsidered. In leaving
a beneficiary's rights vis-A-vis a beneficiary's bank to other law,3 47 the
Model Law goes beyond a rejection of receiver finality prior to a bene-
ficiary's bank's receipt of settlement. 8" Even a beneficiary's bank that
both has accepted a payment order and has received settlement is not
subject to sanctions under the Model Law for failing to pay a benefi-
ciary! 4' A beneficiary's bank's acceptance, however, terminates both
342 U.C.C. § 4A-405(e).
34' See U.G.C. § 4A-209 official comment 3; U.N. Model Law arts. 3, 6(2), 8(1),
16(7).
3" BOJ-NET's two-business day policy is less common than requiring same-day
transmission and settlement. It can be destabilizing for large transfers to remain provi-
sional for an extended period. Until finality exists, the participants in a large transfer
can be adversely affected by financial difficulties at both a participating and a nonpar-
ticipating financial institution. 1986 Annual Report, supra note 8, at 29. FEDWIRE,
the American electronic funds-transfer system operated by the Federal Reserve System,
for example, differs from BOJ-NET in requiring same-day transmission and settle-
ment. See FEDWIRE REPORT, supra note 2, at 10.
341 The sole exception to finality should be an unauthorized payment order. See
supra notes 328-30 and accompanying text.
346 See supra notes 209-10 and accompanying text.
3" See supra notes 239-42 and accompanying text.
348 Receiver finality exists prior to settlement. See supra notes 33-37 and accom-
panying text.
349 See U.N. Model Law arts. 9(1), 16(6).
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the money-back guarantee and any unilateral power to stop payment
that has been preserved, and, in the absence of a special agreement, also
discharges a debt of an originator for which a transfer was made. 50
The Model Law thus permits creation of a situation in which an origi-
nator can not revoke a transfer of funds, and, indeed, may not wish to
do so as his or her debt has been deemed paid. A beneficiary, however,
may not have received unconditional credit and may not be entitled to
require it. Subject to any privileges of setoff that exist under other law,
the Model Law should impose liability for interest upon a beneficiary's
bank that has received settlement for an accepted order yet failed to
give a beneficiary unconditional credit upon the payment date desig-
nated by an originator. If no payment date has been designated or a
beneficiary's bank did not receive an order until after a designated date,
liability for interest should begin upon either the business day upon
which settlement is received or the business day of acceptance, which-
ever occurs last.35 Beneficiaries' banks otherwise would have an incen-
tive to delay making unconditional credit available to a beneficiary in
order to earn interest upon transferred funds and the prompt and cer-
tain payment that electronic funds transfers make possible could be
jeopardized. In view of the importance of wholesale wire transfers to
commercial and financial transactions, this delay should be neither en-
couraged nor tolerated.
350 See U.N. Model Law arts. 8(1)(a), 11(2), 13(1), 17(1)-(2).
A beneficiary's bank can reject an unaccepted order notwithstanding receipt of
settlement. U.N. Model Law art. 8(1)(a),(2). In order to preclude constructive accept-
ance, notice of rejection, however, must be given upon the date of receipt of an order or
the payment date designated by an originator, whichever is later. Id.
351 Unlike U.C.C. Article 4A, which ordinarily conclusively deems receipt of final
settlement from a bank through a Federal Reserve Bank or a funds-transfer system to
give rise to acceptance, the Model Law does not equate receipt of settlement with ac-
ceptance. The Model Law allows a beneficiary's bank to reject any unaccepted order.
See supra notes 224-27 and accompanying text.
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